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1 Introduction 
This thesis is a result of determined curiosity: while reading through articles about 
theory of regionalization I had to question if an interesting topic had gone un-
noticed. In an aspiration to develop the works of Anssi Paasi´s regionalization 
theory further Jonathan Metzger and Peter Schmitt combined that theory with ideas 
from the Actor Network Theory (ANT) and specific ideas from the field of 
sociology. In the paper When soft spaces harden: the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region, from 2012, Metzger and Schmitt develop an ´extended´ regionalization 
theory (here addressed as ´the spokesperson-theory´). A key concept developed in 
their theory is the ´spokesperson´-institution which embodies and functions as a 
representative of the region it is designated by. I noted that their choice of region to 
use as a case example was just one of many “regions” which shared geographical 
space and I wondered “should not shared space by different regions have an effect 
on the regionalisation process?”.  
Metzger and Schmitt structures the spokesperson-theory around the case of the 
`macro-regional strategy' developed under the aegis of the European Commission; 
the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). The paper When soft spaces harden: the EU strategy 
for the Baltic Sea Region examines the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region (EUSBSR) and the European Council (EC) as a spokesperson of the Baltic 
Sea Region1. The case they make by the utilization of their theory for the statement 
that the EC is the spokesperson for the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) 
is seemingly functional. However, (as their paper constructs a theory which then is 
applied to a “most likely case”-example where they barely test nor do 
they mention the existence of other regional bodies which, in various degrees, 
exists in the same space) they leave work to be done on this developed theory; both 
for their theory to be tested and further explored.   
 
                                                                                                                                                            1 Metzger J, and Schmitt P, 2012 
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 Research questions  
What is aspired here is multiple; firstly, a conceptualization of ´overlapping space´, 
secondly, the examination of how regions approach the overlapping space and 
thirdly, the consideration of a theory exploratory or testing approach to the 
“overlapping” of the spokesperson-theory.  
  
 What is this `overlapping space`?  
  
 How do regions strategize about `overlapping space´?  
   
 How does `overlapping space` affect regionalization?   
  
The answers to these questions are tightly connected to concepts and functions 
of regionalization theory and an extended understanding of the dynamics of 
regions. Answering them adds to the understanding of the regionalization theories, 
and to what theoretical and policy implications ´overlapping space´ might have for 
the regions themselves. This in turn provides a possibility for regional 
spokespersons with a base for rethinking their strategies.  
 Operationalization 
The research questions are closely tied to the dynamics of regionalization theory. 
The construct of an “overlapping space” is a potential concept regarding how the 
dynamics of how the regionalization process works. Therefore, finding the proper 
approach to methods of theory development and its requirements on material 
gathering and analysis takes a prominent position as seen in chapter two and three.  
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What a theory is and how they function is presented in chapter two. By which 
methods and what requirements they can be tested, developed and new theories 
created is the focus of chapter three. 
In accordance with Metzger and Schmitt, the appropriate institutional 
characteristic to focus on for material gathering is the spokesperson institution. The 
regions are supra-national institutions and have presented a large source for various 
materials and aspects of how to study them. Regions are a space of human 
construct, specifically a ´spatial´ construct. As all non-physical constructs, regions 
are not so easy to understand and one cannot simply look at it and know what it is.  
To answer the first question, of what overlapping space is, a hypothesis has to 
be constructed. In chapter four the current understanding of these human 
constructions is presented along with important concepts to the processes of 
regionalization so to present what the regionalization theory consists of; spaces of 
human construct (space, time, borders), followed by the theories of regionalization, 
both Paasi´s, Metzger and Schmitt´s spokesperson theory. This procedure gives us 
an idea of a hypothetical “overlapping space” that can be related to and tested in the 
case analysis of chapter five. The hypothesized concept of overlapping space, its 
implications and importance is discussed in chapter six, as is the theory mechanism 
“legitimacy”, a potential missing mechanism between the phases of regionalization. 
The answers and conclusions are presented in chapter seven.  
 Case Selection 
The word origin of 'region' is from Latin: regiō, derived from regere which stands 
for “to govern”. A `region´ is a large area of land that is considered as a unit for 
geographical, functional, social, or cultural reasons which is different from other 
areas of land because it is one of the different parts of a country with its own 
customs and characteristics, or because it has a particular geographical feature2.  
                                                                                                                                                            2 Definition of 'region', 2018 
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According to Paasi´s regionalization theory, a region emerges through a 
continuous process of institutionalization3. Tensions of what the region is, conflict 
about its content and what it shall be is part of this historical process that is on-
going on all sorts of geographical scales4. 
Metzger and Schmitt´s concept of a `regional spokesperson´ comes from 
combining Paasi´s theory of regionalization with an idea from sociology; “that in 
the emergence of social groups […] there is always one member who represents 
and personifies the whole group, or else a small number of them[…] who  each in a 
different respect, individualize it no less entirely in themselves”5. By producing 
discourse in the name of, and in the interests of the region, the regional 
spokesperson attempts to articulate a particular version of the supposed essence of 
the region6.  
Many spatial levels of regions exist but the area of land that the concept of 
region here is applied to here is supra-national, meaning that the regions consist of 
two or more countries. This is so partly in correlation with Metzger and Schmitt´s 
own paper which focused on the case of the EUSBSR, but also in response to an 
aspiration to maintain a certain level of abstraction when considering theory 
development and its methods. 
The selection of cases, regional spokespersons, naturally continues where 
Metzger and Schmitt left off, with the EUSBSR and the European Council (EC) as 
a spokesperson of the Baltic Sea Region. To study `the overlapping space´ the 
additional regional spokespersons studied have a self-defined space on the supra-
national areal level of or about the Baltic Sea.  
The Baltic Sea is a geographical area with many different regional 
constellations surrounding it; prominent examples (aside from the EUSBRS itself) 
are The Nordic Region with the organisations The Nordic Council and The Nordic 
Council of Ministers [collectively called “The Nordic”], and The Council of the 
Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as an alternative spokesperson for the Baltic Sea Region 
(one not created by the EC/EU). A large part of the Nordic region overlaps 
                                                                                                                                                            3 Paasi A, 1986  4 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 5 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:268 6 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:268 
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geographically with the Baltic Sea region. Both the EC/EUSBSR and the CBSS are 
active spokespersons of self-defined areas that in parts differ but that include the 
Baltic Sea as a central theme of these areal definitions. It is a natural selection to 
start with these as possible candidates for the study of overlapping space.  
1.3.1 The CBSS 
As stated on the website of the CBSS is an overall political forum for regional 
inter-governmental cooperation7. The role of the Council is to serve as a forum for 
guidance and overall coordination among the participating states. The Members of 
the Council are the eleven states of the Baltic Sea Region as well as the European 
Commission. The states are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and a representative from the European 
Union. The CBSS has three long-term priorities: Regional Identity, Sustainable and 
Prosperous Region and Safe and Secure Region. The CBSS are seemingly of the 
view that the Baltic Sea identity exists but that it needs to grow in the 
consciousness of a shared Baltic Sea society. Their stated goal is: “To develop the 
Baltic Sea Region as a model region of sustainable societies able to manage and 
use resources efficiently, to tap the economic, technological, ecological and social 
innovation potential of the region in order to ensure its prosperity, environmental 
protection and social cohesion”8. 
This case has a defined regional space which is in sync with the imagined space 
of the region. Identity is one of its top priorities. This emphasises that the CBSS is a 
regional spokesperson institution that joins the imagined space of the Baltic Sea 
Region with the whole “society” of that said region. 
1.3.2  The EC/EUSBSR 
“The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) is the first Macro-regional 
Strategy in Europe.  The Strategy was approved by the European Council in 2009 following a 
                                                                                                                                                            7 Building collaboration & trust, 2017 8 Building collaboration & trust, 2017 
  6 
communication from the European Commission [(EC)]. The Strategy is divided into three 
objectives, which represent the three key challenges of the Strategy: saving the sea, connecting 
the region and increasing prosperity. Each objective relates to a wide range of policies and has 
an impact on the other objectives”9.  
 
The EUSBSR is defined by EU-member states which surrounds the Baltic Sea. 
In the communication approving the creation of this macro-regional strategy eight 
of the nine states bordering the Baltic Sea were members of the European Union10. 
The EU member states involved in the EUSBSR are Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The EUSBSR is coordinated in 
close contact with the European Commission and “all relevant stakeholders”, i.e. 
other member states, regional and local authorities, inter-governmental and non-
governmental bodies11. The EUSBSR also welcomes cooperation with EU 
neighbouring countries (Russia, Iceland, Norway and Belarus). In the EUSBSR-
case, we see an institution collecting many actors and content under its overview. 
Note that the space of the EUSBSR is defined by the EU-member states around the 
Baltic Sea. That thus makes a difference between the imagined space of the region 
(the Baltic Sea) and the outreach of the institution at hand. The possible issue 
thereby posed to this study is one of legitimacy of the regional spokesperson at 
hand. It also has to be noted that the EC is a supra-national institution that did not 
emerge in the Baltic Sea Region, rather its position as a regional spokesperson for 
the Baltic Sea Region was introduced Top-Down. The institution brings together a 
large number of actors around defined issues and interests. The EUSBSR´s three 
objectives are “saving the sea”, “connecting the region” and “increasing 
prosperity”. “Saving the sea” is an ecological priority, “connecting the region” is a 
broad statement which possibly includes more than just transportation (quite 
possibly “connecting” means more) and “increasing prosperity” is an economic 
goal which depends on many variables. These issues and interests are specific but 
                                                                                                                                                            9 About EUSBSR in a nutshell, 2017 10 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region , 2009  11 https://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu, 2017 
  7 
also possibly quite wide in content, making the EC/EUSBSR a good case with 
potential for having an overlapping space that can be defined.  
1.3.3 The Nordic 
The Nordic countries or the Nordics are a geographical and cultural region, they are 
most commonly known as Norden (literally “the North”), which has two primary 
institutions that represent the region; the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of 
Ministers. Both are geo-political inter-parliamentary forums for co-operation 
between the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden as 
well as the autonomous areas of the Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland 
Islands. The Nordic Council of Ministers is constituted by the ministers of each 
country. While they are officially two different institutions they share office, staff, 
and have the same webpage. The Nordic Council of Ministers was also established 
to complement the Council. The two will therefore be seen as “one” institution. 
While the criteria for selection “defined spokesperson” here are lucid (as to the 
Norden Region institution being organized in an "actor dependent" style) the 
Norden makes a strong case for itself as a Region and has an institutional 
framework which lets the region act together and that that institution facilitates an 
agenda whereby they reach outwards as one.  
Obviously, the regions and their institutional have differences which limit their 
comparability, but with a cautious case selection process they are possible to 
compare and to study effectively.   
The review of relevant research and of theoretical background leads to 
conceptualizing overlapping space as a space of regions which exits when two 
regions or more share the same space and that they share a modicum of “same” 
objects in this space. This same space is included in the regions idea of “self” 
to such consistency that it is part of the regions idea of their imagined space. That 
the regions share space is not enough for the space to be `overlapping space´, in that 
space there must be an object that both share; agendas or issues relevant to both 
regions. This object can be a policy, a problem or resource. The object in shared 
space must be of such nature that it is more than just fleeting; that gives time for the 
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interactions of regions. This would be necessary for the ideas of society and identity 
to react.  
The criterion’s for selection by extension of Paasi´s region and Metzger and 
Schmitt´s spokespersons:   
 
 A defined region – Sharing space on a comparatively “same” spatial level.   
 
 Matching institutional level of the region. The types of organization should be 
comparable and sharing agendas to some degree.  
 
 Defined spokespersons. 
 Limitations to the study 
The two narratives of this study are the theoretical concept of overlapping space of 
regions and its implications of actually overlapping regions. While the concepts and 
dynamics presented to some extent can explain how the case regions are 
constructed the way they are today and potentially what they can become, that is 
not the purpose of this thesis. 
This study is kept on a scale where spatial structure can be discussed 
independently of superseding regional formations so not to muddle it with 
regionalization processes on different spatial scales. 
The thesis does not extend to additional cases but it keep to an abstract logic of 
general concepts, mechanisms and functions – other cases has been left for later 
studies, to test the feasibility of what is concluded here.  
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2 Methods of Theory Development 
“Theory consists of plausible relationships proposed among concepts and sets of 
concepts (though only plausible, its plausibility is to be strengthened through 
continued research). Without concepts, there can be no propositions and thus no 
cumulative scientific knowledge based on these plausible but testable 
propositions”12.   
 The theoretical background of this thesis has offered possibilities for both theory 
development and theory creating. The choice of methods was made to leave both 
possibilities open during the research process, especially since the possible results 
of this thesis did not exclude either possibility. With a well-developed approach to 
theory development and theory constructing they would not be mutually 
excluding.  Since the thesis is a few-case study this has also implicated that to be 
theory developing it is important to consider how case-study research can be 
causative.  
 Theory Development 
According to Esaiasson et al. 2007, there are, to be precise, only two types of 
theory developing activities. The first one has to do with finding explaining 
factors13. It can either be about the suggestion of complementing explaining factors 
or about competing explaining factors. The second theory developing activity is 
about the developing of causal mechanisms. With the later one, the ambition is to 
better understand the phenomenon that interests us, how it works and what it 
affects.   
                                                                                                                                                            12 Strauss A, and Corbin J, 1994:278 13 Esaiasson et al. 2007 
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It is said that the ground rule for theory testing studies is that it is better to study 
many cases rather than just one or a few cases and that the opposite principle is true 
for theory developing studies: if one wants to use the empiric to develop theories 
then it is better to collect much material about a few number of cases than to go for 
less information about a larger number14.   
It is said that many researchers who work with intensive close up studies of few 
cases are enthusiastic about their way of working and do not see the distinction 
between theory testing and theory developing as superfluous (see example 
McKeown 1999). The critics of the distinction claim that the differences between 
the two are about the degree and not the type of activity. Since there is always some 
degree of an idea about where to look for explanations, all studies with an ambition 
to explain something are to some degree theory testing. However, arguments based 
on deterministic and probabilistic explanations oppose these critics. Deterministic 
explanations state that (X) is sufficient for something else (Y) to happen, while 
probabilistic explanations are more modest and say that if X then maybe Y will 
happen15.  
A general aspect of how to appreciate the way to conduct theory developing 
studies is to always remember that they are theory testing. For the conclusions to be 
validated they will need to be tested again. Another suggestion to help the theory 
developing study along is to direct it towards causal mechanisms. The empiric 
variables observed in the study are just the first step on the way towards well-
founded conclusions. Until one is in the clear with how the connection between the 
phenomenon in focus and the factors that it affects or result in the study is only half 
done and through the detailed study of the cases we can get a picture of what 
mechanisms that have been involved. The focus on causal mechanisms thus keeps 
us from drawing the wrong and trivial conclusions. This focus can also help us 
detect additional explaining factors that might be involved. Since we are aware that 
complementing explaining factors can be involved we are kept from dismissing 
them on an early stage.   
To further the understanding of theory developing methods we look at the 
Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) upon which case choices made on the basis                                                                                                                                                             14 Esaiasson et al. 2007 15 Esaiasson et al. 2007 
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of general context usually related to. A grounded theory inspired study has the 
spoken purpose to develop theories that are established in empiric research and not 
desk-constructions16. Generally speaking, the thought behind the GTM approach to 
theory development is that the theory should be adapted to the data. The idea is that 
theory development is done by certain steps. To start with relevant categories and 
concepts are created which captures the central aspects of the studied phenomena, 
thereafter the internal order of how these categories and concepts are connected are 
determined. This is an extensive inductive approach; the researcher should to the 
greatest extent build on the observations that are made in the study of the present 
case studied. The most interesting part about the grounded theory approach for this 
thesis is that the GTM starts with ´theoretical sampling´ where one starts with 
studying one or a few cases that for some reason are found interesting. Once a case 
has been selected and studied, a first ´draft´ of vital concepts and possible 
conclusions are discussed and set up in a possible, tentative theory. These are then 
tested by finding alike cases to test them on. When the conclusions have been tested 
by this ´most-likely´ case selection the next step is testing by ´least likely´ cases. 
With this process one ensures that the theory is always deeply rooted in empiric 
data. A grounded theory is never finished but evolves constantly based on what the 
latest examined cases bring forth in regard to earlier results. A theory and its 
concepts are re-evaluated in regard to the number and type of case where it is 
developed. If the theory is based on many cases, it is more interesting than if built 
on a lesser number or more alike cases.  
The types of cases usually studied with this approach are often less data-
extensive and more numerous. The GTM method is best applied where the study of 
cases can be observed first hand or direct accounts of cases exist. The overall 
approach to the development of theory is the same for both the general method of 
theory development and for the grounded theory method, thus; the GTM method 
provides a way to inspire the structure employed for this thesis. By approaching this 
study as a case of theoretical sampling, with a well-analysed material, set principles 
for conceptualizations and the descriptions of possible functions of processes of the 
                                                                                                                                                            16 Esaiasson et al. 2007 
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´overlapping space´ can be hypothesized and examined. In possible later research 
and application on other cases, results can be validated or disputed. 
 
Conceptualization  
Although the base line of a theory has often been thought of in the lines of an 
equation (Conceptualizations and functions + Conceptualization and functions = 
Theory) the process of how to conceptualize has been harder to find in the 
general theory development texts. Strauss and Corbin present how this is done in 
GTM17.  
According to Strauss and Corbin “there is built into the GTM style of extensive 
interrelated data collection and theoretical analysis an explicit mandate to strive 
toward verification of its resulting hypotheses: this is done throughout the course of 
a research project”18, instead of assuming that confirmation is reached only trough 
follow-up quantitative research. Enhanced also by the procedures of the GTM style 
is the possibility of developing theory of great conceptual density and with 
meaningful variation. “Conceptual density” is the richness of concept development 
and relationships – reached trough considerable familiarity with associated data and 
are checked out systematically with these data (not the same as “thick descriptions” 
which puts emphasis on description instead of conceptualization)19. “An 
distinguishing characteristic of GTM besides the constant making of comparisons, 
include the systematic asking of generative and concept relating questions, 
theoretical sampling, systematic coding procedures, suggested guidelines for 
attaining conceptual (not merely descriptive) “density” variation, and conceptual 
integration”20.   
To this thesis´ theory development method, we remember that theory evolves 
during actual research and the continuous interplay between analysis and data 
collection. Theory may be generated, or if existing, be elaborated and modified as 
incoming data are meticulously played against them.  Regardless of level of theory, 
as Strauss and Corbin writes, “there is built into this style of interrelated data 
                                                                                                                                                            17 Strauss A. and Corbin J, 1994:278. 18 Strauss A. and Corbin J, 1994:273-285 19 Strauss A. and Corbin J, 1994:273-285 20 Strauss A. and Corbin J, 1994:273-285 
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collection and theoretical analysis an explicit mandate to strive to verification the 
resulting hypotheses”21. Verification can be achieved throughout the course of a 
research project, it is not only possible trough follow-up quantitative research.   
The general procedure is to ask, what are the influence of power, social class, or 
another concept of study, on the phenomena under study, or in this case; 
what are the effects of overlapping – then to trace this influence as precisely as 
possible, as well as its influence flowing in the reverse direction. Theory 
developing procedures forces us to, for example: What is the mechanics here? What 
function has this concept and how does this function manifest here, by whom, 
when, where, and with what consequences22? 
 Misunderstandings regarding Case-study research 
What can be explored from few cases when regarding theory development? In the 
article Case-Study Research Misunderstandings Five Misunderstandings About 
Case-Study Research, from 2006, five common misunderstandings about case-
study research are examined:  
 
“(a) General, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, 
practical (context-dependent) knowledge; (b) One cannot generalize on the basis of an 
individual case; therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (c) The 
case study is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, at the first stage of a total research 
process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; 
(d) The case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency to confirm the 
researcher’s preconceived notions; and (e) It is often difficult to summarize and develop general 
propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies”23.  
 
According to its author, Flyvbjerg, the case study can have a value in and of 
themselves – they do not have to be linked to hypothoses following the 
hypothetico-deductive model of explanation. The five misunderstandings indicate 
                                                                                                                                                            21 Strauss A. and Corbin J, 1994:273-285 22 Strauss A. and Corbin J, 1994:273-285  23 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006  
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that it is theory, reliability, and validity that are the actual issues. General, 
theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, 
practical (context-dependent) knowledge24. To understand why the conventional 
view of case-study research is problematic there is a need to grasp the roles of cases 
and theory in human learning25. Two points are made in this context, firstly that 
“the case study produces context dependent knowledge that research on learning 
shows to be necessary to allow people to develop from rule-based beginners to 
virtuoso experts” and secondly that “in the study of human affairs, there appears to 
exist only context dependent knowledge, which, thus, presently rules out the 
possibility of epistemic theoretical construction”26.  
 
“Such knowledge and expertise also lie at the centre of the case study as a research and teaching 
method or to put it more generally still, as a method of learning. Phenomenological studies of 
the learning process therefore emphasize the importance of this and similar methods: It is only 
because of experience with cases that one can at all move from being a beginner to being an 
expert. If people were exclusively trained in context-independent knowledge and rules, that is, 
the kind of knowledge that forms the basis of textbooks and computers, they would remain at the 
beginner’s level in the learning process. This is the limitation of analytical rationality: It is 
inadequate for the best results in the exercise of a profession, as student, researcher, or 
practitioner”27.  
 
Furthermore, it is commonly thought that a single case is in itself to “individual” to 
be a basis for generalization, because of this the case study has less to offer to 
scientific development. Flyvbjerg corrects this second misunderstanding by 
declaring that “One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case 
study may be central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or 
alternative to other methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of 
scientific development, whereas “the force of example” is underestimated”28. 
Flyvbjerg continues by quoting to Anthony Giddens who writes that  
 
                                                                                                                                                            24 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006  25 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006  26 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222  27 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222  28 Giddens, A, 1984:328 
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“Research which is geared primarily to hermeneutic problems may be of generalized importance 
in so far as it serves to elucidate the nature of agents’ knowledgeability, and thereby their 
reasons for action, across a wide range of action-contexts. Pieces of ethnographic research 
like… say, the traditional small-scale community research of fieldwork anthropology—are not in 
themselves generalizing studies. But they can easily become so if carried out in some numbers, 
so that judgements of their typicality can justifiably be made”29.  
 
Flyvbjerg agrees to this but complements that this is not the only way to work: it 
also depends on the case in question and how it is chosen30. An illuminating 
example is Galileo’s contradiction of Aristoteles theory about gravity were a 
critical case study was constructed to test the theories; random and large samples 
were at no time part of the picture. A strategic choice can add much to the 
generalizability of a case study, so also in social science. 
Regarding case selection, if a theory could be proven false in a favourable case 
then it will most likely be false for intermediate cases. Flyvbjerg states that formal 
generalization, whether on the basis of large samples or single cases, is 
considerably overrated as the main source of scientific progress31. It has been 
shown that “the most important precondition for science is that researchers possess 
a wide range of practical skills for carrying out scientific work: generalization is 
just one of these […] and formal generalization is only one of many ways by which 
people gain and accumulate knowledge. That knowledge cannot be formally 
generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of 
knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society”32. In fact, it has been 
argued that case studies are likely to produce the best theory. 
Since case studies are useful for generalizing by use of the type of test called 
“falsification”, which in social science is used for critical reflexivity. “Falsification 
is one of the most rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be subjected: 
If just one observation does not fit with the proposition, it is considered not valid 
generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected”33.   
                                                                                                                                                            29 Giddens, A, 1984:328 30 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006  31 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006  32 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006  33 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006  
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The third misunderstanding Flyvbjerg corrects is that the case study has its 
greatest use for generating hypotheses, as in contrast to other methods which 
supposedly are more suited for hypothesis testing and theory building. This 
misunderstanding is similar to the previous one, that generalization on the basis of 
individual cases cannot be done. Because that misunderstanding has been revised, 
as above, Flyvbjerg corrects the third misunderstanding by observing that the case 
study is indeed useful for both the generating and testing of hypotheses, however, is 
not limited to these research activities alone. “The testing of hypotheses relates 
directly to the question of “generalizability,” and this in turn relates to the question 
of case selection. Here generalizability of case studies can be increased by the 
strategic selection of cases”34.   
The general advice given on how to identify critical cases is to look for either 
“most likely” or “least likely” cases35. Another possibility is the “Paradigm cases”, 
cases that highlight more general characteristics of the societies in question. 
Flyvbjerg himself have some problem understanding what a paradigm case is and 
thus approached another to ask this question, Dreyfus as his name was, replied that 
“you recognize a paradigm case because it shines, but I’m afraid that is not much 
help. You just have to be intuitive. We all can tell what is a better or worse case — 
of a Cézanne painting, for instance. But I can’t think there could be any rules for 
deciding what makes Cézanne a paradigmatic modern painter.... It is a big problem 
in a democratic society where people are supposed to justify what their intuitions 
are. In fact, nobody really can justify what their intuition is. So you have to make 
up reasons, but it won’t be the real reasons”36.  
There is a worry that the case study contains a tendency to confirm the 
researcher’s preconceived notions. This bias toward verification is general, and the 
case, along with other qualitative methods, are often seen as less rigorous than are 
quantitative, hypothetico-deductive methods. Flyvbjerg thinks of this critique as 
fallacious since case studies has their own rigor, different but not less strict than of 
quantitative methods. The case study has the advantage that it can “close in” on 
situations and test ideas directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice. 
                                                                                                                                                            34 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006  35 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222  36 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222 (Flyvbjerg/ Dreyfus personal communication, 1988) 
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The case study forces the researcher to focus on the type of falsifications described 
above. It is falsification, not verification, which characterizes the case study37.  
A perceived problem with case studies is that a single case study is often 
difficult to summarize and that it difficult to develop general propositions and 
theories on the basis of specific case study. Again, Flyvbjerg argues against this 
perception as another misunderstanding. “Case studies often contain a substantial 
element of narrative. Good narratives typically approach the complexities and 
contradictions of real life. Accordingly, such narratives may be difficult or 
impossible to summarize into neat scientific formulae, general propositions, and 
theories. This tends to be seen by critics of the case study as a drawback. To the 
case study researcher, however, a particularly “thick” and hard-to-summarize 
narrative is not a problem. Rather, it is often a sign that the study has uncovered a 
particularly rich problematic. The question, therefore, is whether summarizing and 
generalization, which the critics see as an ideal, is always desirable”38. Flyvbjergs 
answer is that the summarizing of case studies can be difficult, however, that is less 
correct in regard to case outcomes. The problems in summarizing case studies have 
more to do with the properties of the reality studied, not the case study as a research 
method. “Often it is not desirable to summarize and generalize case studies. Good 
studies should be read as narratives in their entirety”39.  
Explicit warnings has been raised against summarizing dense case studies: “It is 
simply that the very value of the case study, the contextual and interpenetrating 
nature of forces, is lost when one tries to sum up in large and mutually exclusive 
concepts”40. The dense case study has more usage for its user and is more 
interesting for social theory than factual “findings” and high-level generalizations 
of theory according to Lisa Peattie41. The opposite of summing up and “closing” a 
case study is to keep it open.  
Openness can communicate whole case in its diversity, allowing it to unfold 
from many sides, showing its complexity, and potentially conflicting notions. By 
relating the case to broader philosophical positions that cut across specializations 
                                                                                                                                                            37 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222  38 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222  39 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222  40 Peattie, L, 2001: 260 41 Peattie, L, 2001: 260 
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one can leave the scope open for different interpretations, this allows one to draw 
diverse conclusions regarding the question of what the actual case is a case of42. 
“The goal is not to make the case study be all things to all people. The goal is to 
allow the study to be different things to different people”43. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            42 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222  43 Flyvbjerg, B, 2006:222  
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3 Materials and Methods of analysis 
“Overlapping space” of regions demands that multiple regions (partly) share space 
which is considered part of both regions. A correct conceptualization of both what 
this space is and how it influences regionalization theory has required an overview 
of previous research on the field of ´regions` and an analysis and comparison of 
regions which has such a ´overlapping space`. To properly observe ´overlapping 
space` (and related dynamics of regions) it has been important to approach this 
process with care and with selected tools.  
In accordance with the developed ideas of Metzger & Schmitt, the appropriate 
institutional characteristic to focus on for material gathering is the spokesperson 
institution44. Material with the highest validity relating to how regions strategize are 
gathered through interviews with their representatives, correlated with policy 
documents and various other policy out-put the institutions produce such as 
recently develop agendas and organization purpose descriptions. For example; the 
Action Plan for the EUSBSR, the Action Plan for Cooperation between the Baltic 
Assembly and the Nordic Council 2018 – 2019, the Nordisk råd – Internasjonal 
strategi for Nordisk råd 2018-2022, and the Decision by the Council of the Baltic 
Sea States on a review of the CBSS long term priorities Adopted through silent 
procedure on 20 June 2014. 
The basic method of gathering the texts and documents is simple: gather them 
and read them with a basic cautionary to source-critical analysis. For an analysis of 
the gathered text and documents the qualitative text analysis has been used. The 
method for qualitative text analysis is explained in the first part of this chapter 
(3.1). Interviews have been conducted with Torkil Sørensen (Previously for the 
Nordic Council Secretariat, Senior Adviser, IR-relations), Johan Lindblad (The 
Nordic Council Secretariat, Senior Adviser), Peter Schenk (European Commission, 
                                                                                                                                                            44 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2012 
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Director General for Regional and Urban Policy – Competence Centre Macro-
region and European Territorial Cooperation – EUSBSR), and with Bernd 
Hemingway (Deputy Director General of the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States Secretariat)45. All of whom can be considered either, the spokesperson of the 
institution that they represent or, that institutions leading expert on the relevant 
subject. In the second part of this chapter (3.2) methods of conducting interviews in 
relation to a few case scenario is described and then followed by methods of 
interview analysis46.  
 Qualitative text analysis  
Qualitative text analysis processes are about active reading, to question the text and 
asking if the text, or yourself, can answer those questions. Sources usually have to 
be read and analysed multiple times for a deep understanding of them47. The 
usefulness of this method can be distinguished by two separate main types of text 
analytical inquiries: firstly, those about systematising the content of selected text 
and secondly, those meant to critically review their content. Systematising is a 
variant of describing analysis done to distinguish thought structure of a specific 
actor, to find logical order and to classify the texts. The cases for this kind of text 
analysis can easily be applied to actors of any kind. An example of text 
systematising analysis is done by Patrik Hall in his book Den svenska historien 
(2000), where he tries to reveal/distinguish how a less defined power of state has 
acted to create a Swedish identity through the centuries. The approach has been 
                                                                                                                                                            45 Interview with Torkil Sørensen (Previously for the Nordic Council Secretariat, Senior Adviser, IR-relations), Johan Lindblad (The Nordic Council Secretariat, Senior Adviser), with Peter Schenk (European Commission, Director General for Regional and Urban Policy – Competence Centre Macro-region and European Territorial Cooperation – EUSBSR), and with Bernd Hemingway (Deputy Director General of the Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat). 46 As social constructions strategies between actors (regions, regional spokespersons) sometime need to be viewed from a skeptical perspective I also prepared to use a motive analysis method for potential added insight. The analysis did not encounter any contradicting motivations and the prepared motive analysis method proved unnecessary. Therefore, since it could have proven useful (and likely would be in a case region where spokespersons could have different inter-relations than these spokespersons in the Baltic Sea), it has been excluded from the thesis but included in the annex (Annex 9.4). 47 Esaiasson et al. 2007:239 
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applied to various primary and secondary sources of texts produced of and about 
the case regions, both policy documents, news articles and policy documents48. The 
resource gathering was done with a basic cautionary to source-critical method in 
order to determine reability of the material49. The content analysis helped revealing 
spokespersons interests and policies which i.e, the content regions assign to their 
space, thus defining what kind of space the regions make for themselves and their 
spaces of activity.  
Critically reviewing research goes a step further than the systematising studies 
method. The idea critical approach works to decide to what extent a given 
argumentation adheres to some set norms – rational or moral50. Conducting a text 
critical review showed little meaning for this thesis. The research questions about 
how regions strategize and how this affect the regionalization processes are not 
related to ideologies and thus more suitably examined with a motive analysis 
method then by a method for analysing the rationale of norms and morals.   
 Conducting interviews and interview analysis  
How these regional spokespersons understand their relationships with other regions 
are expressed by representatives of the regions. The interview method chosen here 
is the ´key informant interviews` which are qualitative in-depth interviews with 
people who know what is going on in a specific community. Key informant 
interviews collect information from people who have first-hand knowledge about 
the community. These key informants, with their expert knowledge and 
understanding, provide insight on the nature of problems and give added context on 
the subject at hand. 
This part of the paper, regarding interview methodology, is based on the report 
Conducting Key Informant Interviews in Developing Countries A.I.D. Program 
Design and Evaluation Methodology Report No. 1351.  
                                                                                                                                                            48 Hall, P, 2000 49 Defined by Thurén, T, in the book Källkritik from 1997 50 Esaiasson et al. 2007:240  51 Kumar, K, 1989 
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Key informant interviews involve interviewing a select group of individuals 
who are likely to provide needed information, ideas, and insights on a particular 
subject52. Two characteristics of this method need special mention. The first 
characteristic, is that “only a small number of informants are interviewed. Such 
informants are selected because they possess information or ideas that can be 
solicited by the investigator. Depending on the nature and scope of an inquiry, the 
investigator identifies appropriate groups from which the key informants are drawn 
and then [select] a few individuals from each group”53. The second characteristic is 
that key informant interviews are in essence qualitative interviews. Such interviews 
are conducted by “using interview guides that list the topics and issues to be 
covered during a session. The interviewer frames the actual questions in the course 
of interviews. The atmosphere in these interviews is informal, resembling a 
conversation among acquaintances. The interviewer subtly probes informants to 
elicit more information and takes elaborate notes, which are developed later. If all 
the relevant items are not covered in a session, the interviewer goes back to the key 
informant”54. Interviews are invested with special meaning and relevance in the 
present discussion because of their unstructured nature55.  
 
Kumar tells us that key informant interviews are appropriate “when 
understanding of the underlying motivations and attitudes of a target population is 
required: key informant interviews can help determine not only what people do but 
why they do it. Such interviews are excellent for documenting people’s reasons for 
their behaviour”56. Thus, they are also perfectly complemented with an expressed 
motive analysis57.  
Some advantages of conducting interviews are; (1) that data originates directly 
from knowledgeable people and may offer confidential information, providing data 
and insight that would not be revealed in other settings; (2) this method provides 
the flexibility for the researcher to explore new ideas and issues that had not been 
                                                                                                                                                            52 Kumar, K, 1989 53 Kumar, K, 1989 54 Kumar, K, 1989 55 Kumar, K, 1989 56 Kumar, K, 1989 57 Kumar, K, 1989 
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anticipated while planning the study/interview but that are relevant to its purpose; 
(3) it is generally easy to find people with the necessary skills to conduct key 
informant interviews because most social scientists possess the professional 
training and experience required. Key informant interviews provide a limited basis 
for quantification and therefore they are rarely appropriate when quantitative data is 
needed58.  Interviews are only one part of the source material for this thesis. With 
the few interviews conducted the validity of this study is achieved through the 
correlation of various sources of materials. Validity of a higher degree is required 
when making anything less abstract than a feasible argument for the mechanisms 
and functions of a hypothesis or a theory; it is thus not as much of a requirement for 
the development of theory as when confirming a theory. 
3.2.1 Analysing interview data  
I found it suitable to work with a version of summary sheets with the main 
advantage of enabling one to reduce vast amounts of information into manageable 
themes that can be easily examined. Each interview summary sheet provides 
information about the key informant. According to Kumar summary sheets should 
contain the reasons for his or her inclusion in the study, the informant’s main 
observations, the implications of these observations and the interviewer’s 
assessment of the key informant, together with any insights and ideas that evolved 
during the interview59.  
Once the tentative findings are made, it is necessary to review them carefully 
for accuracy and to ensure that they are grounded in empirical reality. The key 
informant interview method is susceptible to errors and biases. I conducted this 
analysis in relation to the content analysis of various text-based sources to insure 
empirical reality. 
                                                                                                                                                            58 Kumar, K, 1989:3pp 59 Kumar, K, 1989:29p 
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Krishna Kumar describes some steps that can help reduce the most common 
sources of biases and errors in key informant studies. By so doing Kumar assesses 
the reliability of key informants in terms of five different criteria60:  
 
“-Knowledgeability: A good key informant has first-hand knowledge of the issues and is 
therefore in a position to give accurate information. If the informant is relying on secondary 
sources, they too, must be proven reliable and accurate.  
-Credibility: The key informant answers questions thoughtfully and candidly. He or she is 
perceptive about the issues and does not exaggerate or play up his or her own importance.  
-Impartiality: In some cases, a key informant may have an ulterior motive for providing 
inaccurate information. For example, it is not uncommon for the management staff to 
exaggerate the positive in the project’s performance and accomplishments and the problems in 
project implementation. A respondent whose comments are overly positive or negative does not 
make a good key informant.  
-Willingness to respond: If, for some reason, an informant is not totally cooperative during 
the interview, his or her hesitancy should be considered during the data analysis stage.  
-Outside constraints: The presence of outsiders during the interview can seriously 
influence responses. For example, project participants are less spontaneous in the presence of 
program managers than when they are alone with the interviewer. An added problem in some 
studies is that interviewers are accompanied by two or three staff members. The arrival of a 
group of “officials” also intimidates some key informants, especially those from low 
socioeconomic groups“61. 
 
It is also important that the investigator to look at his or her own biases, they may 
affect interviews and the analysis of the data generated by them. Notable biases to 
be aware of are the ´hypotheses confirmation bias´, and the ´concreteness bias´.  
Hypotheses confirmation bias: is the most persistent bias in key informant 
interviews and arises from a focus on the information and ideas that confirm the 
investigator’s preconceived notions and hypotheses. Investigators should therefore 
take care to demonstrate objectivity and not to ignore contradictory ideas62. When 
producing a hypothesis once should make a point of looking for the unexpected, the 
evidence that its feasibility faulty. 
                                                                                                                                                            60 Kumar, K, 1989:29p 61 Kumar, K, 1989:29p 62 Kumar, K, 1989:31p 
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Concreteness bias: “a key informant who provides vivid descriptions may be 
given more credence than others who make substantive points without concrete 
illustrations”63. An informant who describes an isolated event in great detail can 
make a deeper impression on the interviewer, as can specific data may impress an 
interviewer even though such data may be partial or even inaccurate. It is important 
for the investigators to be conscious about such biases64.   
                                                                                                                                                            63 Kumar, K, 1989:31p 64 Kumar, K, 1989:31p 
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4 Space of Human Construct 
Regionalisation is a process of structuring human space within which the 
structuring that occurs over time. Independent of which space it might be (social, 
political, economic, historical, special or geographical priority) human space is the 
setting for regional development. Therefore, it is needed to have an understanding 
of ´time` and ´space` before we can have an adequate understanding of ´regions` 
and the processes of ´regionalization` or for what can be created out of a theory 
testing and developing study.  
This chapter reviews the theoretical foundation of `regionalization´; starting 
with the concepts of time and space of the human construct of regions and what can 
be abstracted from space and objects regarding social theory, then more concrete 
concepts of the academic field of regional studies so to extract a denser 
understanding of the dynamics that an “overlapping space” would be depending 
upon. For an actual understanding of a hypothetical concept, this review is 
important. 
 Space influence social relation theory  
Space itself is a debated subject in many disciplines which results in different 
interpretations and distinctions between these disciplines. In the book Social 
Relations and Spatial Structures, from 1985, by Derek Gregory and John Urry,  
´space` is approached with a discussion about the “long-established philosophical 
debate as to whether space and time are to be viewed as in some sense absolute 
entities, possessing their own natures or particularities”65; it is asked whether space 
is casually productive: should it be distinguished from matter since it has a structure 
                                                                                                                                                            65 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:49  
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or should it be considered just `relative´, a way to describe relations and 
connections between objects of the real world?  
The latter view is `an order of co-existences as time is an order of successions. 
By this perspective on space, the universe is simply consisting of different objects, 
composed in various ways, and these objects exhibit spatial relationships between 
each other and between their own constitutive parts. According to the Gregory and 
Urry it is the relationists argument that if any statements do appear to assign 
properties to space it will be logically possible to reduce these properties to the 
relations between the objects concerned66.  
 
“Most of the conventional distinctions between disciplines (especially those between economics, 
politics, and sociology, on the one hand, and history and geography, on the other) make it 
difficult to relate time and space to this analysis of social relations. Specifically within 
sociology the distinction between social system or social structure and social change seems to 
restrict temporal analysis merely to the latter. Likewise, the concept of ´society´ constrains 
analyses within certain socio-spatial parameters and makes difficult the theorization of 
structures and processes which do not conform to the concept of the individual ´society´”67.  
 
It is therefore problematic to specify what difference space makes. How 
important is it and how should space and its supposed effects be understood? What 
are the implications of space for social theory and practice68?  
While the difficulties of theorizing might seem severe it is argued that the 
difference it makes and its possible implications for social theory are 
misunderstood. The view is that the difficulties in theorizing space are largely due 
to failures to distinguish abstract from concrete research69. Abstractions involve 
concepts designed to refer to particular one-sided aspects of objects. Usually, the 
´objects` of study are many-sided or “concrete”; as such, the various constitutive 
elements isolated by abstractions need to be synthesized70.  
To the realism approach ´objects` are understood to possess casual powers and 
liabilities to do or suffer certain things by virtue of their structure and composition, 
                                                                                                                                                            66 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:45pp 67 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:45pp 68 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:49  69 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:49  70 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:49  
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where whether specific liabilities or casual powers are activated depending on 
contingently related conditions71. Realism pays considerable attention to the nature 
of relations and distinguish between necessary relations (such as that a husband and 
wife does not exist as a single part without the other) and contingent relations 
(neither necessary nor impossible). Weather, relations are necessary or contingent, 
“abstract theory must remain agnostic about their form on any particular occasion, 
or at least make claims about what might happen in them conditional upon an 
assumption about their existence”72.  
The given answer to what difference space makes is that space can only be 
understood in terms of the objects that constitute it. An implication of this is that 
the study of space, and regions, must be rooted in social theory73. Regionalization is 
grounded in social theory and should be seen through a realist perspective. To 
understand the space of an object, a region, in relation to any other object, we must 
understand the regions separately and also that the space between the constituting 
objects in said space must be explored.  
4.1.1 The difference that space makes  
That space makes a difference is proved by mundane reflection according to Sayer: 
that things has to be in the right place if we are to use them or be affected by them 
is common sense74. This argument might seem odd but if we look closer at the 
meaning of `space´. Space, in terms of geographical absolute space, is empty. 
Relative space only exists where it is constituted by matter. While space is 
constituted by objects it is not reducible to them. Space only exist in and through 
objects and is also independent of the types of objects there. Matter always 
necessarily has spatial extension and spatial relation only exist through objects75. 
There is no understanding space without its content since there is no space without 
content. “Yet depending on the nature of the constituents, their spatial relations 
may make a crucial difference […] but only in terms of the particular casual                                                                                                                                                             71 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:50 72 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:50 73 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:51 74 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:51 75 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:52 
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powers and the liabilities constituting it. Conversely, what kind of effects are 
produced by casual mechanisms depends inter alia on the form of conditions in 
which they are situated”76.   
According to Oxford References `Social space´ is ”[t]he combined use and 
perception of space by distinct social groups, as opposed to personal space. [It] is 
produced by societies according to the spatial practices that exist within the 
society77. The produced space is a set of relations between objects within the space 
[…]. Social space provides an environmental framework for the behaviour of the 
group; it is flexible/networked […] multi-dimensional and multi-layered social 
space defined by political, social and institutional capacities’ […]”78.  
In social space ´objects` are of a different nature than a pure physical entity. 
Henri Lefebvre tells us that “[social] space is not a thing among other things, nor a 
product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and 
encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity – their 
(relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence and set 
of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object. At the 
same time there is nothing imagined, unreal or 'ideal' about it as compared, for 
example, with science, representations, ideas or dreams. Itself the outcome of past 
actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others 
and prohibiting yet others. Among these actions, some serve production, others 
consumption (i.e. the enjoyment of the fruits of production). Social space implies a 
great diversity of knowledge”79. Social space can be understood as a place of what 
is and what it should be – it is the discourse and understanding of ´the here and 
now`, the objects in it, its resources and the how and why to get ´there`. It is our 
understanding of our surroundings and how it could or should be viewed. Abstract 
social theory only needs to consider space insofar as necessary properties of object 
are involved, which according to Sayer does not amount to very much. However, 
“abstract social science cannot ignore the fact that the possibilities and problems of 
                                                                                                                                                            76 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:52 77 In this study of overlapping social space it would be the spatial practices between (as societies) the regional institutions. 78 Oxford Reference: Social space, 2019 79 Lefebvre, H, 1991:73 
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reproducing and transforming social forms depends on the integration of their 
elements in space-time”80.  
Regarding ´space`, one common error of thinking about it is to assume “that 
because space only exists where it is constituted by objects it is wholly reducible to 
them”81. Another type of error is thinking that, one; space (territory) is not just 
something outside and prior to society, rather it is something produced by society; 
and two, thinking that the spatial hence is therefor social. The constituents of space 
are neither reducible to its objects nor is it correct to reduce to just those 
constituents which are socially produced. “The spatial is partly constituted by the 
social, but is reducible neither to natural nor social constituents. Certainly spatial 
structures may have ´roots in production and class relations´ but there are plenty of 
other possible constituents – natural and social – of space”82.  
To accurately describe the world the description would have to be as large as 
the world. To describe one of the case regions, reduced to space, objects, their 
constituents and relations is also a large undertaking. This study involves the 
relation between multiple regions. Researchers in fields such as this chose to 
depend upon aggregates and averages which describe the whole system but fails to 
observe causality by ignoring spatial form or to conduct studies which allow 
concrete analysis and casual explanation of limited parts of the subject but which 
leave substantial areas uncovered83.  
 
 Dynamics and Concepts of Region-space and 
objects  
According to Paasi´s theory, first presented in his paper The institutionalization of 
regions A theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of regions and 
the constitution of regional identity, from 1986, the region emerges through a                                                                                                                                                             80 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:58pp 81 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:58pp 82 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:58pp 83 Gregory, D, and Urry, J, 1985:61pp 
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continuous process of institutionalization84. The region is understood as “a process 
in the course of which a specific areal unit within a society gradually emerges, 
through the mediation of various functions, as an entity with a status of its own not 
only as the territorial exponent of certain functions but also as a specific part of the 
areal system internalized in the consciousness of the society in question”85. Paasi´s 
theory has been referred to as a “processes of spatial formation”. These processes of 
regional institutionalization occur in four phases and over time:  
 
1; Areal or territorial delineation 
2; Conceptual or symbolic formulation 
3; Institutional establishment and 
4; Acceptance as an areal entity 
 
By the fourth stage the area may be said to possess a special regional identity of 
its own. It is a repeated argument that “regions should be analyzed as congealed, or 
at least partially stabilized, products of processes of regionalization, which are 
always interventions in the world, and whereby the drawing up of boundaries, both 
tacit and explicit, and effects of inclusion and exclusion are produced, both 
internally and externally”86. The process of regional formation is on-going, never 
complete and always changing. Regions are entities that can be seen as a process 
that is mutable, porous, un-even, never complete and always changing. Tensions of 
what the region is, conflict about its content and what it shall be is part of this 
historical process that is on-going on all sorts of geographical scales87. 
4.2.1 Regionalization, spatial planning, ´soft space` and ´fuzzy 
boundaries`   
“Patterns of movement and flows of people, culture, goods and information mean that it is now 
not so much physical boundaries - the geographical distances, the seas or mountain ranges - 
                                                                                                                                                            84 Paasi A, 1986  85 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 86 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 87 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 
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that define a community or nation’s ‘natural limits’. Increasingly we must think in terms of 
communications and transport networks and of the symbolic boundaries of language and culture 
- the ‘spaces of transmission’ defined by satellite footprints or radio signals - as providing the 
crucial, and permeable, boundaries of our age”88. 
  
“Boundaries exist in many ways as manifestations of socio-spatial consciousness (and power) in 
social practices and discourses: in politics, administration, economics, culture or the 
organisation of ethnic relations. They doubtless also have material and textual manifestations 
(newspapers, books, maps, drawings, paintings, songs, poems, various memorials and 
monuments, etc.) which reveal and strengthen the material and symbolic elements of historical 
continuity in human consciousness”89. 
 
´Spatial planning systems` refer to the methods and approaches used to influence 
the distribution of people and activities in spaces of various scales. Spatial planning 
can be defined as the coordination of practices and policies affecting spatial 
organization. Spatial planning takes place on local, regional, national and inter-
national levels and often results in the creation of a spatial plan90. There are quite a 
few definitions of spatial planning. An early one is found in the European Regional/ 
Spatial Planning Charter (often called the ‘Torremolinos Charter’), adopted in 1983 
by the European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning 
(CEMAT):   
 
“Regional/spatial planning gives geographical expression to the economic, social, cultural and 
ecological policies of society. It is at the same time a scientific discipline, an administrative 
technique and a policy developed as an interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach directed 
towards a balanced regional development and the physical organisation of space according to 
an overall strategy”91. 
 
Allmendinger and Haughton have highlighted the emergence of numerous entirely 
new planning scales in the form of `soft spaces' with `fuzzy boundaries', these 
spaces consists of informal or semiformal non-statutory spatialities of planning with 
                                                                                                                                                            88 Morley & Robins, 1995:1  89 Paasi, A., 1996:24 90 Spatial planning, 2018 91 The Torremolinos Charter, 1983:13 
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associations and relations stretching across both formally established boundaries 
and scalar levels of planning and across previously entrenched sectoral divides92. 
These emerging soft spaces of planning can to various degrees be seen both to 
supplement and to supplant existing `hard' (i.e, formally recognized and statutorily 
defined) planning spatialities93. Activities of spatial planning is becoming 
progressively more focused on the type of activities referred to as `metagovernance' 
practices94.  
 
“Metagovernance can be seen as a “complex process for creating shared understandings of 
acceptable behaviours, enforced through diverse mechanisms, not least the shared involvement 
in creating strategic documents required by the policy integration agenda, and agreement on the 
instruments for ensuring conformity”: metagovernace is thus a form of “governance of 
governance”95.  
 
By this “governance of governance” the “rules of the game” are codified and 
policies are scripted96. Spatial planning work has been described as always 
beginning `in the middle' – in a situation constrained by multiple factors which are 
beyond both control and (usually) knowledge of the planner97. Metzger and 
Schmitt´s spokesperson-theory, with their added insights on regionalization theory 
further developed from ideas based in Actor-Network Theory (ANT), regard 
“processes towards regionalization are seldom streamlined, but generally marked 
by strife and struggle over the right to determine the ascribed boundaries and 
substance of a certain regionalization”98.  
  
“Concerning the case of any specific region, various actors can be intervening and propose new 
variations upon how the region should be conceive and it may lead to situations with multiple 
and often conflicting suggestions as how to envision that region which is floating around at the 
same time, sometimes partially connecting, sometimes standing in direct conflict with each other 
or appearing as mutually excluding. That might mean that one often cannot talk of `the region' in 
                                                                                                                                                            92 Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G, 2010 93 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:265 94 Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G, 2010 95 Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G, 2010:808 96 Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G, 2010:808 97 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 98 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 
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the singular, but must rather refer to it in the multiple, as simultaneously existing, alternative 
versions of a region that are often (but not always) mutually excluding. Even at the case of just 
one region; at some points the development towards a singularization of a specific region may 
occur, either due to the launching of intentional programmes of action or as the unintended 
outcome of the unfolding of events”99.  
 
How this holds true for situations where multiple different regions co-exist must 
depend on the content determining the difference between those regions (example: 
identities can coexist but can they merge?) Economic areas might more easily 
become one singular area if the interests of the actors/regions are the same. Various 
fields of constructs should be variously adaptable depending on its constitution.  
The process of merging is called ´singularization`. As a general merging of 
different versions of a region, singularization is never absolute or incontestable.  
According to Metzger and Schmitt, “increased degrees of singularization 
should be seen as a form of ontological closure which makes active contestation 
more difficult and costly, as greater amounts of resources and allies need to be 
mustered to have a reasonable shot at prying apart the strong associations which 
may have become established through such a process. When a certain version of 
the region becomes more stabilized, fixed, and formalized, it may in time become 
more or less a `collateral reality' which is taken for granted and reproduced daily 
without much reflection”100. The formation of spatial entities, such as regions, is a 
produce of the alignment and stabilization. The products of these spatial processes 
are regions ever changing, not without an end but always dependent on the 
processes that creates, sustain, and dissolves them101. Questions of `soft spaces' and 
`fuzzy boundaries' should not be confused with questions concerning the durability 
or fragility of spatial entities. According to Metzger and Schmitt a “fluid 
robustness” of spatial entities only lasts “as long as there is ´no single strongpoint 
to be defended in order to preserve continuity`, no ´need for fixed frontiers to be 
patrolled`, no ´need for police action to safeguard the stability of elements and 
their linkages`, and ´no network structure to be protected`”102. 
                                                                                                                                                            99 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 100 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 101 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 102 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267p 
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Metzger and Schmitt´s concept of a `regional spokesperson´ combines Paasi´s 
theory of regionalization with the idea “that in the emergence of social groups there 
is always one member who represents and personifies the whole group, or else a 
small number of them who, each in a different respect, individualize it no less 
entirely in themselves”103. Metzger and Schmitt recognize that “one of the 
important steps in the process towards the potential singularization, stabilization, 
and institutionalization of a spatial entity is the emergence of regional 
spokespersons who, through `grouping talk´, act as the […] spokesperson of the 
[…] interests of the, in this case, spatial entity”104. The term `territorial 
spokesperson´ can signify any actor which is gifted or capable of taking upon itself 
the capacity to act as the voice of a spatial entity, such as regions, confronting 
spatial issues and presenting spatial solutions. By producing discourse in the name 
of the region and in the name of the interests of the region, a regional spokesperson 
can claim legitimacy and takes upon itself [or is given?] the right [or ability?] to 
“formulate the interests of the region and the power to define what does and does 
not belong to the region, hence both attempting to position itself as the legitimate 
embodiment of the voice of the region and, at the same time, articulating a 
particular version of the supposed essence of the region”105. This “regional 
spokesperson” of Paasi´s theory could be said to be an additional mechanism to the 
fourth phases of his theory, one which focus on the singularization process of 
regions. One can speculate if legitimacy is not only taken but also be given by other 
actors if they find one among themselves that has the capacity to function as their 
spokesperson.  
 The Space of Regions  
Space itself is a debated subject in many disciplines which results in different 
interpretations and distinctions between these disciplines.  
                                                                                                                                                            103 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:268 104 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:268 105 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:268 
  36 
Social space here is between the regional spokespersons around the Baltic Sea 
and how they use it. Regional content is produced by the needs of the society within 
a singular region. Common needs between regions opens up for cooperation. 
Societies which share more also have more to cooperate about. Depending on how 
they cooperate about issues and objects that they share, practices are developed. 
According to the definition of social space106, the character of these practices 
between the regional spokespersons reflects the practices that exist within each 
region. 
The regions are objects themselves and the processes, a “social calculation” of 
regionalization, soft space and hard boundaries, singularization, which takes place 
in a complex space trough interaction of differently compositional objects and over 
time. The space of a region is the space it imagines as its space of relevance. We 
see this in how a region/spokesperson identifies towards a specific area of the world 
and its relation with actors therein.  
The objects of a region are determining factors of various forms that it has to 
have a relationship to: actors, resources, obstacles, the interests it holds and process 
it bring about as an institution.   
Boundaries are the distinctions between spaces, a distinction made by 
specifying which objects (such as specific issues, problems or resources) that 
belongs to either space. Not all boundaries separate the same objects but different 
boundaries are made up of the inclusion or exclusion of various objects.  
Regionalization, as `metagovernance´, are a complex process for creating 
shared understandings of acceptable behaviours and “processes of spatial 
formation” – The rule of the game for how regions interact is an exponent of the 
societies that creates them, their space, their objects, their values and their interests. 
4.3.1 Hypothesis of what `overlapping space´ is:  
After the above review, the overlapping space can be conceptualized by the 
happenstance that two regions or more not only share the same space but when that 
space is also defined by the same subject or issue /that the regional spokespersons 
                                                                                                                                                            106 Oxford Reference: Social space, 2019 
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of each regional space have self-specified agendas and interests in common with 
each other.  
The same space must be included in the regions idea of “self”, of such 
consistency that it is part of the regions idea of their imagined space. That the 
regions share space is not enough for the space to be `overlapping space´, in that 
space there must be an object (a single issue, problem or resource) that both share; 
an object of subject relevant to both regions. This object in shared space must be of 
such nature that it is more than just fleeting; this gives time to the interactions of 
regions which would be necessary for the ideas of society and identity to react.   
If this conceptualization of `overlapping space´ captures the essential relevant 
mechanisms of time, space, and regionalization, we can hazard some further 
deductions. One rule of interaction would be that the dynamics of interactions 
between two social entities are based on their idea of `us` and `them´. Therefore, it 
is important to examine how regional spokesperson institutions approach each other 
and how they see the overlapping space: ´Is the overlapping space or the other 
region a threat?`. With that restricted and calculated logic we can structure a 
proposal for how regions strategize about overlapping space. The hypothesis is that 
their strategizing is the collective output of relational dynamics dependent on some 
limited options.   
 
The regional spokesperson might act to: 
 
1; to include the other in their overlapping space,   
 
2; to exclude each other from their overlapping space,  
 
3; to include objects of the overlapping space, i.e. to add content to their space or   
 
4; to exclude objects of said space, to null the resource/issue and redefine that 
which is shared.   
 
(5; to stun us with something unforeseen).  
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The function of this relational dynamics would, from each of the regions points 
of view have to consider the following; 1) is it a resource that we share the object or 
an issue and, 2) do we want to protect it from others or are the others wanted for 
cooperation?  With such a function we can sketch up some scenarios for region 
strategization and tentative outcomes, by so doing we can also determine some 
central topics which determine the dynamics of regionalization in overlapping 
space. 
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5 The Cases and “Profiling” Analysis 
It is important to assess how the regions were formed, how the institutions defining 
interests came into being, how they view their space. With this focus the dynamics 
of the regionalization theory is related to and its mechanisms and functions 
problematized. Does the region formation process match Paasi´s theory? What has 
driven the process onwards? It also tests the hypothesis of the previous chapter: 
How do the regional spokespersons act regarding overlapping space? If they find 
objects to be shared, one way or the other, then the overlapping space exists. In this 
manner we can also look for any “unforeseen” circumstance which can 
problematize the hypothesis.  
In this chapter, with the various sources of materials that have been gathered, I 
have produced a ´region profiling` by asking questions alike “what are their modus 
operandi?”, “what space is the space of their region?”, “how do they reflect upon 
´the other`?”, “what are rule of the game for how regions interact?”, “what are the 
objects the regions have to consider?”, “what are their space of interest/relevance?”, 
“what is the regional identity?”, “which processes forms this region?”. The aim of 
these profiles is to familiarized with their organization, history (society/political 
connection), space and objects (policy), their relation to the other regions, their 
“others”, and how they act towards these. This operationalization results in that 
some key notions are brought up and reflected upon. These notions are pointed out 
at the end of each “profile”. This ´profiling` is an easy overview of the regions that 
does not describe the whole world (as an accurate description of the world would 
have to be as large as the world itself) but these questions, of a general nature, are 
derived from the dynamics and concepts of regionalization theory; they should 
therefore allow a concrete analysis and casually explain factors relating to the 
research questions and the viability of the hypothesised ´overlapping space`.  
In accordance with the operationalization these notions are related to previous 
research and theory that was brought up in the previous chapter while keeping in 
mind that processes and mechanisms are the makings of theory and that theory 
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consists of plausible relationships proposed among concepts and sets of concepts. 
Theory is never finished but evolves constantly based on what the latest examined 
cases bring forth in regard to earlier results. A theory and its concepts are re-
evaluated in regard to the number and type of case where it is developed. 
The case regions are the CBSS, the EC/EUSBSR and the ´Nordic`. The second 
of these regions and Schmitt dubbed to be a regional spokesperson for the Baltic 
Sea region107. The second and third are both regional institutions of (about) the 
same spatial scaling with aligning interests and space.  
The profiling itself is a simple construction beginning with the space and 
objects of each region, one region after the other. Regional strategization towards 
´the other`, i.e. testing how the hypothesis has held up, is also carried out in this 
context. The notions lifted out for a closer look in chapter six are mainly 
observations on the regions constituent “objects” and structures of relations 
between these case regions.  
 CBSS profile: Spokesperson, Space and Strategy 
The CBSS spokesperson:  
”When we were created it was kinda of surrounded experience of the just fall of the Berlin wall 
and the and the kind of dismantling of the two blocs that had […] of occupied the Cold War  for 
the longest period of time in Europe and of course it was important [to] see how, in regions that 
were at the border between those two blocks how to […] bring people closer together […] on 
common issues and then of course the whole issue of an integrated Europe and to […] see how it 
could bring countries together to avoid […] cold or real war was kind of [at the heart of] Europe 
again was what I think the main reason behind creating this so to kind of create a forum were 
people and countries were able to identify their common issues and to address them”108. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            107 (perhaps it was a restrictive dubbing as a ´the Baltic Sea of Europe` with a singular focus and identity as the Baltic Sea being part of Europe and EU) 108 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 
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“the CBSS, and to underline my conviction that Europe’s Northern Dimension stands on the 
threshold of tremendous new opportunities – for continuing democratic development, for 
enhanced regional cooperation, and for shared prosperity”109. 
 
The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is a good example of a regional 
spokesperson. It is an overall political forum for regional inter-governmental 
cooperation110. “The CBSS was established by the region’s Foreign Ministers in 
Copenhagen in 1992 as a response to the geopolitical changes that took place in 
the Baltic Sea region with the end of the Cold War. Since its founding, the CBSS 
has contributed to ensuring positive developments within the Baltic Sea region and 
has served as a driving force for multi-lateral co-operation”111. The role of 
the Council is to serve as a forum for guidance and overall coordination among the 
participating states. The Members of the Council are the eleven states of the Baltic 
Sea Region as well as the European Commission. The constituting states are 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
Russia, Sweden and a representative from the European Union.   
The CBSS has three long-term priorities: Regional Identity, Sustainable and 
Prosperous Region and Safe and Secure Region. “Regional identity” tells us that 
the CBSS accounts for a society of “us” in this region. In this context they describe 
their goal for their intention to both foster a Baltic Sea Region identity and to create 
a notion of unity across borders112. That statement clarifies that they have the view 
that the Baltic Sea identity exists but that it needs to grow in the consciousness of a 
shared Baltic Sea society. “Sustainable and 
Prosperous” connects primarily ecological and economic interests. Also for 
this long-term priority, when the CBSS describes its goals for ecology and 
economy, they emphasise a “society of the region”. Their stated goal is: “To 
develop the Baltic Sea Region as a model region of sustainable societies able to 
manage and use resources efficiently, to tap the economic, technological, 
ecological and social innovation potential of the region in order to ensure its 
                                                                                                                                                            109 Chris Patten, 2002-03-06 110 Building collaboration & trust, 2017 111 Building collaboration & trust, 2017 112 Building collaboration & trust, 2017 
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prosperity, environmental protection and social cohesion”113. “Safe and Secure” 
indicates not just a priority of stability in itself but also a shared view on what 
that safety should be, thus showing that the Baltic Sea Region 
has shared values and interests.   Identity is one of its top priorities which 
emphasise that the CBSS is a regional spokesperson institution which “society” of 
that region. One observation that should be noted here is the process of how the 
formation of the institution did not originate in any specific “Baltic Sea society” but 
rather as a result of different actors reaching out from around a common area, an 
area not defined by society which had been prohibited by the Iron Curtain but by a 
geography of common issues and potential new relations.  
 
The space and objects of CBSS´s Baltic region 
A progress report on these long-term priorities, Progress in Strategic Actions to 
Implement the CBSS Long-term Priorities, present activities that have happened 
over the years and projects that are being run as of 2015, it informs the reader that 
the Nordic Council of Ministers focus on capacity building for local and regional 
authorities and awareness raising campaigns114. 
In the document Decision by the Council of the Baltic Sea States on a review of 
the CBSS long term priorities Adopted through silent procedure on 20 June 2014 
the CBSS declares, amongst much else that they are agreeing that: “the CBSS 
should strive to improve regional cooperation, where added value can be attained, 
seek synergies and ensure coherence with other actors, enhance competitiveness, 
develop cross-border activities promote sustainable use of resources and improve 
communication to implement the Vilnius Declaration and other regional strategic 
documents as appropriate […] and that “the work of the CBSS should reflect the 
principles of democracy, social inclusion, sustainability, cultural diversity and non-
discrimination, including gender equality; and that these principles should be 
mainstreamed in all its work”115. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            113 Building collaboration & trust, 2017  114 Progress in Strategic Actions to Implement the CBSS Long-term Priorities, 2015:3  115Decision by the Council of the Baltic Sea States on a review of the CBSS long term priorities Adopted through silent procedure on 20 June 2014, 2014 
  43 
The CBSS has a defined regional space which is in conjugation with the 
imagined space of the region. The make-up of participating actors was remarked as 
being a very diverse region where most of its countries are members of the EU. 
Bernd Hemingway´s comments on the actors of the regions are “we have two 
countries in the north, Norway and Iceland who don’t belong to the union but are 
very close to the union and to a certain extent also implement EU legislation and 
then we have one country that is not at all connected, or kinda, not to that extent, 
which is Russia”116.    
The CBSS actors/participants come from a space determined by the 
geographical image of the Baltic Sea. However, in the constellation of participants 
we also see Iceland and a representative from EU. The geographical image is 
characterized by the countries around the Baltic Sea which has access to the 
sea. This geographical image of the region is enforced by a historical continuum 
where the sea was the main conduct for connectivity. That Iceland, which lacks 
border to the Baltic, is associated to this region could be explained by 
accepting that the idea of a space is created by more than geographical boundaries 
but also by a cultural or a political spread of “us”; through Iceland’s political 
affinity and/or cultural belonging. The image of the Baltic Sea Region that the 
CBSS represents would not be equally bearing to the other actors of the region as 
an image without Iceland. The EU has been given room in the context of 
CBSS´s Baltic sea region too; the reasons therefore can be scrutinized with 
questions over which came first the, EU or the CBSS? The CBSS originated from 
a need to draw the Baltic Sea together into something more than two sides of an 
ocean after the fall of the wall and the Soviet. The EU had a central part in the 
development of the CBSS, EU-policy has had a major part in what the CBSS 
channels, and today EU is a formal part of the actors constituting the CBSS. It begs 
the question of which identity the CBSS implement in the region of the Baltic 
Sea. While the channelled identity in the region and the cultural affinity of the EU 
can be further examined, the political importance of the EU in the context of the 
CBSS´s Baltic region can´t be ignored.  
                                                                                                                                                            116 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 
  44 
The defined interests of this region are its three long-term priorities: Regional 
Identity, Sustainable and Prosperous Region and Safe and Secure Region. In the 
space of this region and over time the CBSS draws together actors to attend the 
issues and possibilities related here to.   
It is a goal for the long term priority “Regional Identity” to “develop the 
concept of Baltic Sea Region identity for and a sense of belonging to the Baltic Sea 
Region through engagement, participation and multilevel governance, in a 
community spirit and to create a notion of regional unity across borders by 
developing people-to-people contacts through dialogue, macro regional networks 
and institutions”117. “Regional identity” binds the region together and creates 
legitimacy. With this priority they want to “create a notion of regional unity across 
borders by developing people-to-people contacts through dialogue, macro regional 
networks and institutions”118. To this end, several activities, programmes and 
networks are organized: Balticlab – an initiative aimed at increasing regional 
future-thinking, innovation and prosperity by encouraging entrepreneurial and 
creative industry collaborations, and; EuroFaculty Pskov, and the CBSS Summer 
University which report to the Ministers of Culture of the Baltic Sea Region 
through the CBSS Group of Senior Officials on Culture and evets like “Baltic Sea 
Youth Dialogue 2017” which aims to bring regional cooperation into 
perspective by engaging future generations119.  
“Sustainable and Prosperous Region” address problems and possibilities that the 
actors around the region have in common. Goals of the CBSS are to:  
 
“develop the Baltic Sea Region as a model region of sustainable societies able to manage and 
use resources efficiently, to tap the economic, technological, ecological and social innovation 
potential of the region in order to ensure its prosperity, environmental protection and social 
cohesion"; To contribute to the eradication of obstacles hampering the comprehensive and 
sustainable development of the region; Objectives: To improve the overall competitiveness of the 
Baltic Sea region through sustainable economic growth and labour markets, research and 
development, innovative infrastructure, an integrated maritime policy, transport and 
communications; To support the transition of the Baltic Sea region towards a competitive, green                                                                                                                                                             117Decision by the Council of the Baltic Sea States on a review of the CBSS long term priorities Adopted through silent procedure on 20 June 2014, 2014 118 Building collaboration & trust, 2017  119 Baltic Sea Youth Dialogue 2017, 2017 
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and low-carbon economy thereby ensuring sustainable development and inclusive growth; To 
support further action to reach a good environmental status and a healthy ecosystem supporting 
a prosperous Baltic Sea Region; To strengthen the region`s capacity to adapt to climate change 
and the resilience capacity of ecosystems and societies; To ensure further mainstreaming of 
sustainable development at all levels and in all policy sectors, integrating economic, social and 
environmental aspects; To promote sustainable and green technologies and initiatives in order 
to protect the ecosystem and biodiversity of the Baltic Sea region”120. 
 
The belief is that regional cooperation contributes to improved living 
standards for the BSR, that the joint knowledge and efforts of the countries in 
searching for efficient solutions contributes to accomplishing sustainable economic 
and social development, healthy societies and dynamic ecosystems in a balanced 
and integrated manner121.   
The priority area of “Safe and Secure Region” aims at enhancing “societal 
security and safety in the Baltic Sea Region and to ensure that people of the Region 
are protected from and resilient to violence, accidents and emergencies through 
preparedness, and safeguarded against harm caused by criminal exploitation and 
human trafficking”122. This priority area is supported by several specialized CBSS-
related networks and structures. Well-developed cooperation exists in civil 
protection network, based on cooperation between national rescue and crisis 
management authorities, as well as in most fields of law enforcement, such as 
cross-border crime-related networks of police, border guard, prosecutors and tax 
administrations. These different structures and networks have defined the level, 
degree and nature of cooperation and activities quite differently. Some of the CBSS 
related civil security networks meet only annually at the highest level to exchange 
views, whereas others have established permanent communication channels and 
take joint operational actions on the ground. However, the general tendency is a 
movie towards more operational, concrete and practical cooperation123.  
5.1.1 Noted observations and questions regarding the CBSS case: 
                                                                                                                                                            120 Building collaboration & trust, 2017  121 http://www.cbss.org/safe-secure-region/, 2017 122 http://www.cbss.org/safe-secure-region/, 2017 123 http://www.cbss.org/safe-secure-region/, 2017 
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CBSS overlapping space exist in regards to the EU, the Nordic region and with 
Russia. The CBSS-strategy towards these spaces depends on the objects concerned. 
The overall strategy CBSS is the fostering of cooperation which is the policy on 
most of its specified interests. The CBSS works together with other actors and 
regions “where is makes sense” and keeps in mind that what is positive for one 
member is also positive for all members of the region. The notable 
exceptions are in regards to Russia - a member of the region but where cooperation 
is more limited - and in regard to cooperation with the Nordic region on the topic 
of identity.   
When working together with other actors there are different mechanisms that 
work out. There are institutions which facilitate arenas for different issues such 
as “the four-sea state council” of which the CBSS is one and the others are the Artic 
council, the “Barents Sea / Artic Council” and the “Nordic Council” (these 
institutions are at one times called “the sister councils”).  
 
 “we are actually working where it makes a sense and [...] a lot together. We are also working 
together on [...] soft policy areas like for example in the area of trafficking of human beings, in 
particular with the Nordic Council, and other areas and with the EUSBSR”124.  
 
The cooperation with Russia appears to deal with a lack of synergy between 
different policy spaces: 
 
“[W]e are speaking to find and see how we can bring in the ´Russian Strategy for the North-
Western Region´ which is under development and how are we able to connect that with the EU 
strategy and how we can find synergies between those two strategies that also makes 
a sense together. So that is how we try to connect all of these areas, to coordinate, to work 
together where it makes sense, engage where we have added value and otherwise to kinda keep 
in contact and keep the conversation going and the exchange of information”125.  
 
We can therefore note that the inclusion of Russia in the CBSS Baltic Sea 
Region appears to be with some form of boundary challenge.  
                                                                                                                                                            124 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 125 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 
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With a strategy ruled by “cooperation” the CBSS becomes one actor among 
many where many interests and issues correlate between them. “I think the work 
for "the sister council" is in a way of co-ordination so it is not policy setting but it is 
of course [helping] [and aided] by analysing and learning from others”126.   
For the CBSS the region of the Baltic Sea is a space where they try to connect 
the different objects of its space to its related actors to find added value and if not, 
to learn from each other: "we try to connect all of these areas, to coordinate, to 
work together where it makes sense, engage where we have added value and 
otherwise to kinda keep in contact and keep the conversation going and the 
exchange of information"127.  
The CBSS strategy is that where they have found common issues in shared 
space and on these issues they are “…working where it makes a sense and [...] a lot 
together…”128. However, a problematic relationship with Russia has been observed 
and this relationship seems to be due to value differences and thus also signalling 
borders. These borders limit cooperation on policies and produce a situation where 
cooperation has to be undertaken with greater care to political differences. This sort 
of dynamics of overlapping space also determines which actors who can be allowed 
to bring added value to cooperation. Value differences towards others and other 
regions are marked by lower, or more struggling, cooperation where areas for 
policy overlays and cooperation are fewer. Inherent values of a policy determine 
what space that policy can cover with legitimacy of its own. Values connect to 
identity. Identity is space- and actor bound and both are limited by space. 
Russia, to some degree, seems to be the “other” but the CBSS strategy applies 
to them as well – where added value for both parts can be found there is 
cooperation. Where space is shared it facilitates interaction and the spread of 
understanding of values or of shared interests which can best be faced together. 
Interconnectivity is part of the dynamics of space – expressed implicitly through the 
concept of soft space and fuzzy boundaries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            126 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 127 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 128 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 
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Noting the “Bottom-up” question and “Identity” 
The CBSS represents a Baltic Sea region. It is a rather new organisation and has its 
foundation in a Baltic Sea society.  A related question is how deeply rooted this 
Baltic Sea society is, but as the “historical processes” which forms this region has 
been dominated by division of states and larger entities it is quite possible that the 
Baltic Sea region has a low connection to a shared society. If that is true, then any 
spokesperson institution for this region might suffer from low legitimacy and 
therefore also a lesser possibility to develop on its own. It could also explain why 
“Regional Identity” is a long term priority of the CBSS. Identity is one area 
where the same object in the same space differs between the CBSS and 
neighbouring regions. Identity is not an obvious object to cooperate with others 
on since identities differ between the regions.  
According to Bernd Hemingway, the Northern countries have a northern 
identity because they have been working together for  a long time and the Baltic 
Sea Region is working on its own identity, in a way in parallel to see how it 
engages with those countries that are not part of the North: “there are areas 
where [it] makes more sense and some like this one where it does not make that 
much sense but [where] we still kind of working together to see and to learn from 
each other”129.   
On the question of how the CBSS consciously has developed its strategy for 
cultural identity Bernd Hemingway answers that “when you look back to the 
situation in Europe in 1992 the situation in the region was quite different. And 
because it is, or it was, only two of the Baltic Sea states members of the EU, namely 
Germany and Denmark. So, the main aim at the time was to support European 
integration on a regional level, and that I trust for the first years for the longest 
while was the main aim”. When much of the Baltic Sea states had integrated into 
the EU “is […] also the time when the CBSS started to re-orient itself and that was 
the time when it started to work on this, on this long-term priorities”130. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            129 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 130 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 
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“[Identity] needs to develop and that needs to be promoted in a way and that needs to have a 
chance to find out, to grow and that for the all the activity. In a way everything we are doing 
kind of promoting the regional identity”131. 
 
“[I]t was important to kind of see how, in regions that were at the border between those two 
blocks how to kind of bring people closer together and to on common issues and then of course 
the whole issue of an integrated Europe and to kind of see how it could bring countries 
together”132. 
 
“There is a regional identity but of course it is to be worked on. It needs to be recognised”133. 
 
“[T]he ´regional identity´ is the most challenging of those long-term priorities because it is also 
something that needs to be developed and that people have to buy into”134. 
 
In these passages (and in the implicit institutional timeline presented on their 
homepage135) we observe that the CBSS came into being to connect the different 
actors of the Baltic Sea, to try to integrate them into an EU community. When this 
was implemented the focus of the institution changed and began working on its 
long term priorities: “Regional identity”, “Sustainable and Prosperous”, “society of 
the region”, and “Safe and Secure”. The confirmation that there were no “identity” 
so much as a “geographical awareness” can be deemed to reflect that the “Baltic 
Sea Region” was not a region created out of a historical process bound to an 
existing society, rather the CBSS was created by actors reaching out to create a 
forum, a forum which later formulated an agenda for a still becoming Baltic Sea 
Region that still lacks much of an society, an identity, that people still have to buy 
into.  
                                                                                                                                                            131 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 132 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 133 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 134 Bernd Hemingway, 2016-06-23 135 http://www.cbss.org/council/history/, 2017 
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 EC/EUSBSR profile: Spokesperson, Space and 
Strategy 
EC/EUSBSR Spokesperson: 
The EUSBSR is defined by EU-member states which surrounds the Baltic 
Sea. In the communication approving the creation of this macro-regional strategy 
eight of the nine states bordering the Baltic Sea were members of the European 
Union136. With the adaption of the first `macro-regional´ strategy the EU has started 
to charter new territory in transnational cooperation and cohesion policy137. The 
eight EU countries that make up the Baltic Sea Region face several common 
challenges which are reflected in the jointly-agreed Action Plan for the EUSBSR138 
(sometimes simply referred to as “The Strategy”).  
 The EU member states in the EUSBSR are Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The EUSBSR is coordinated in 
close contact with the European Commission relevant stakeholders such as other 
member states, regional and local authorities, inter-governmental and NGOs139. As 
is stated the EUSBSR also welcomes cooperation with EU neighbouring countries 
(Russia, Iceland, Norway and Belarus).  
The European Commission coordinates the efforts of the European Union (EU) 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). The Strategy is an agreement 
between the Member States of the EU and the EC to strengthen cooperation 
between the countries bordering the Baltic Sea in order to meet the common 
challenges and to benefit from common opportunities facing the region. 
 
"The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) is the first Macro-
regional Strategy in Europe.  The Strategy was approved by the European Council in 2009 
following a communication from the European Commission. The Strategy is divided into three 
                                                                                                                                                            136 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region , 2009 137 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K, 2016:3.  138 Action Plan for the EUSBSR, 2017 139 https://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/about, 2017 
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objectives, which represent the three key challenges of the Strategy: saving the sea, connecting 
the region and increasing prosperity. Each objective relates to a wide range of policies and has 
an impact on the other objectives”140. 
 
The EUSBSR, along with strategies developed for the Danube Region (EUSDR) 
the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR) and the Alpine Region (EUSALP), is a 
´macro-regional strategy´ which under the EU Cohesion Policy is defined as “an 
integrated framework endorsed by the EU, which is supported by the European 
Structural and Investment Funds among others, to address common challenges 
faced by a defined geographical area relating to Member States and third countries 
located in the same geographical area which thereby benefits 
from strengthened cooperation contributing to achievement of economic, social and 
territorial cohesion”141. In the book “A 'Macro-regional' Europe in the Making, 
Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence” by Stefan Gänzle snd Kristine 
Kern (2016), it is stated that these macro-regional strategies are in theory new 
multi-level governance instruments and that this creates new ideas about territorial 
spaces, the opportunities and challenges in these spaces and which provides new 
ideas on forms of intervention142. These strategies have been criticised for their 
practical difficulties in reconciling different versions and interests of stakeholders, 
as have their priorities in relation to the available resources143. “Conceptually, 
macro-regional strategies have also been criticized for their incoherence, 
questionable legitimacy and effectiveness”144.  
Other EU `macro-regions´ have, as Gänzle and Kern puts it “started to self-
identify” and the developments that they ensue has been depicted as a new tool of 
European integration145. These regions are “socially constructed”. Their space is 
soft and their boundaries fuzzy. Historical and cultural commonalities are not their 
core origin but rather “macro-regions are both `imagined´ and `manufactured´ the 
need for functional cooperation around, for instance, a common regional sea, 
                                                                                                                                                            140 https://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/about, 2017 141 Macro-regional Strategies, 2017  142 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K, 2016:47 143 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K, 2016:47 144 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K, 2016:47 145 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K, 2016:3  
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mountainous area or river system, which [transcends all territorial frontiers]”146. 
The conceptualization of these macro-regional strategies is that they are an 
integrated framework relating to member states and third countries in the same 
geographical area; that they addresses common challenges; and that these benefit 
from strengthened cooperation for economic, social and territorial cohesion147. 
Many elements provide a basis for macro-regional cooperation – a regional sense of 
identity, a wish for common strategic planning, and to pool resources148. The 
macro-regional strategies are regional building blocks for unison EU policies as 
they create a calling for national approaches into coherent EU-level 
implementation149 that draw functional cooperation and territorial cohesion closer 
together by bringing together groups of units that are at the same time part of (or 
related to) a more comprehensive polity entity than national or other administrative 
regions. A possible way to look at the EUSBSR is as a purely soft space 
administrative tool for the EU witch, in itself, does not aim at defining its allotted 
space or objects as anything “us”-regional. Potentially, the EUSBSR-institution 
could be a tool for that purpose if the EU were so intent. The Macro-regional 
strategies would have to have their capacities and/or functions redefined to include 
strategies for EU-identity and values. An “other” and borders would be required; 
the soft space administrative tool would probably be less of a soft space then. The 
idea of a `Europe of Regions` has been proposed by European federalists such as 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Denis de Rougemont. According to Gänzle and Kern 
their argument is that regions could be a means of safeguarding the principles of 
subsidiaries and democracy within a larger federal entity150. This way of imagining 
the `Europe of Regions` also view the region as a structural base which legitimizes 
the entity above.  An argument is that an “EU region of the Baltic Sea” would be 
supra-regional, above the Nordic or Baltic Sea, on an identity/society scale and                                                                                                                                                             146 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K, 2016:4  147 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the  European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Concerning the Added Value of Macro-regional Strategies, 2013 148 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the  European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Concerning the Added Value of Macro-regional Strategies, 2013 149 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the  European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Concerning the Added Value of Macro-regional Strategies, 2013 150 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K (Eds.), 2016:10 
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identities are not mutually excluding: Nordic and Baltic identities would not be a 
hindrance to a European identity.  
 
Space  
Additionally to the eight EU countries of the Baltic Sea Region some countries 
outside the EU also participate actively in projects under the Baltic Sea Strategy151. 
Norway is often involved, as is Russia, as an important partner country. Iceland and 
Belarus also participate at times. The determining factor for members of this region 
is that they are member states of the EU and that they border the Baltic Sea. For 
additional participants of cooperation, the determining factor is that they face 
common challenges or add value to the (EC-value based) cooperation of the EC-
value based Baltic Sea.   
By its institution which joins together a large number of actors 
around defined issues and interests: their three objectives; saving the sea, 
connecting the region and increasing prosperity. Saving the sea is an ecological 
priority, “connecting the region” is a broad statement which possibly includes more 
than just transportation; quite possibly “connecting” means 
more; increasing prosperity is an economic goal depending on many variables.  
 
Objects/region defined interests  
The EUSBSR comprises a number of policy areas/horizontal actions to save the 
sea, connect the region and increase prosperity – each with flagship projects as well 
as identified targets and indicators for set policy goals.  For example, the EUSBSR 
regards cleaning up polluted sea, mitigating against the effects of climate change, 
and combating cross-border crime. It focuses on “joint problem-solving and all of 
the many opportunities that cooperation provides”152. The EUSBSR is used as a 
tool to streamline and prioritise actions in the Baltic Sea Region. The Strategy helps 
to mobilise relevant EU funding and policies, it coordinate the actions of parties 
such as the European Union itself, EU-member states, pan-Baltic organisations, 
                                                                                                                                                            151Action Plan for the EUSBSR, 2017 152 The Baltic Sea Region Strategy for Beginners, 2017 
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financing institutions and NGOs to promote and it balances development of the 
Baltic Sea Region153.   
 
-“EU member states identified common challenges and common opportunity which could be best 
tackled at the BSR; so for which issues for which the member state is to small an entity and the 
EU 28 is to large”154.  
 
In addition to issues regarding the Baltic Sea itself that are specific to the EU 
countries bordering it, the EUSBSR covers many other common challenges and 
opportunities. Whether the issue concerns transport solutions, joint education 
ventures or the environment, the starting point is always the same: that common 
challenges can be solved better if the work is done together. In the first instance, 
the EUSBSR concerns the EU Member States in the Baltic Region.  The Baltic Sea 
Region Strategy’s objectives are; “Save the Sea”, “Connect the Region” and 
“Increase Prosperity”155. The “Save the Sea”-objective aims at achieving a good 
environmental status and biological diversity in the Baltic.  These sub-objectives 
are: clear water in the sea, rich and healthy wildlife, clean and safe shipping, and 
better cooperation. The “Connect the Region” -objective aims at “bringing people 
closer to each other so that they can benefit from [the exchange of] knowledge and 
ideas and by doing business with each other. This can be through student and 
research exchanges for instance, or via business contacts. It´s also about ensuring 
access to communications options and the Internet. Connect the Region also fosters 
cooperation projects aimed at combating cross-border crime such as human 
trafficking and smuggling stolen goods”156. “Increase 
Prosperity” promotes entrepreneurship, innovation, trade and digitally-driven 
growth. Through better cooperation in research and development and by deepening 
the internal market the countries bordering the Baltic can strengthen their 
competitiveness and their prosperity157. The Baltic Sea region strives for deepening 
and fulfilling the single market, the implementation of Europe 2020 Strategy, 
                                                                                                                                                            153 EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 2017 154 Peter Schenk, 2016-06-30 155 The Baltic Sea Region Strategy for Beginners, 2017 156 The Baltic Sea Region Strategy for Beginners, 2017 157 The Baltic Sea Region Strategy for Beginners, 2017 
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improved global competitiveness of the Baltic Sea region, climate change 
adaptation, and risk prevention and management.  
   
Strategy 
For the EC/EUSBSR the ´overlapping space´ is part of the reality by which it 
has been designed to work. Any “other” is not mentioned by the EC/EUSBSR in 
this context. The overall strategy is very straight forward, as made clear by 
the interview held with Peter Schenke:  
 
“The main rationale for the strategy, why it was created is that you have member states around 
the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), EU member states identified common challenges and 
common opportunity which could be best tackled at the BSR; so for which issues for which the 
member state is to small an entity and the EU 28 is to large. [...] it is a clearly defined 
geographical area, you have; [...] the ecological state of the Baltic Sea, that is 
obviously identified as a problem that could only be solved when if all Baltic Sea states jointly 
take effort to improve the state of the ecological state of the Baltic Sea. [...] If you look at 
the economic growth, at research, at education, [...], transport, energies, security, lot of 
transport connections in the Baltic Sea: a lot of issues where it was considered that this could 
best be dealt with at the level of the member states around the Baltic Sea”158.  
 
“we are working very much with these existing networks so the idea of the strategy is [...] not to 
duplicate the activities which are already taking place but rather to 
increase [...] the transparency [of] what they are doing [...] in order to avoid overlaps”159.   
 
A notion that comes to view through this ´profile´ of the EC/EUSBSR is a 
regional spokesperson which, while fitting in with the concept of a regional 
spokesperson, relates to the Baltic Sea Region differently than that “region” which 
is conceptualized in Paasi´s regionalization theory: the EC/EUSBSR is structured 
and oriented towards the coordination of various policy spaces in the 
region. Furthermore, the institution is limited to coordinate funding and to 
the coordination of policy spaces of existing networks. All the EU macro-regional 
strategies are developed based on the policy principle called ´three No´s´; no new 
                                                                                                                                                            158 Peter Schenk, 2016-06-30 159 Peter Schenk, 2016-06-30 
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institutions, no new legislation, and no new funding160. The Three No´s: No 1: 
Before the establishment of the EUSBSR as a macro-region “under the EU 
umbrella”, quite a few institutions already existed in the BSR (including the CBSS, 
the Helsinki Commission, the EU´s Northern Dimension and the Nordic 
Council). None of these institutions did take an integrated approach to coordinating 
all the sectoral policies that are relevant to the BSR. It is said that as a result 
thereof, together with a lack of resources on their own part and sufficient resources 
and local knowledge available at the macro-regional level, the EC did not want to 
manage the strategy directly – instead a governance model involving institutions 
and organizations from the participating regions should be applied161. No 2: The 
member states have decided to implement the strategies but no binding regulations 
are issued. No 3: Coordination on the already existing resources was more 
important than additional funding. “The key emphasis is on aligning existing 
resources available at the EU, national, subnational and/or local level, using both 
public and/or private resources – established under diverse policy themes and 
territories to develop jointly agreed actions and projects”162. 
The institution holds no direct connection to either claimed region identity 
or regional society. It is observed that, unlike the previous spokesperson-cases, the 
EC/EUSBSR shows a distance between its institution, its region space and 
the identity of the region. This distance between identity, region and institution 
could likely explain the critique of low legitimacy aimed at the EU macro-regional 
strategies as a whole. The importance of the EC/EUSBSR in terms of overlapping 
space is that of ´function´ or capacity; to coordinate funding through space to 
policy. An additional observation from the interview with Peter Schenke is that 
the idea formulating regards funding and that the institution responds to an idea 
of heightened effectiveness. The idea was legitimate enough in this context to 
create an institution.  
                                                                                                                                                            160 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the  European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Concerning the Added Value of Macro-regional Strategies, 2013 161 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K (Eds.), 2016:50p 162 Gänzle, S, and Kern, K (Eds.), 2016:50p 
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5.2.1 Noted observations and questions regarding the 
EC/EUSBSR case: 
It is noted that the EC is a supra-national institution that did not emerge in the 
Baltic Sea Region, rather its position as a regional spokesperson for the Baltic Sea 
Region was introduced Top-Down. An essential question that has to be answered in 
determining the EC´s legitimacy as a spokesperson for the BSR is whether the BSR 
is considered a region in its own worth or that as a region whose worth is as a 
subdivision of the European Union.  While this question is unanswered this does 
not make for disqualification from selection as a case, the EC/EUSBSR is still a 
regional spokesperson of a defined region.  
This institution collects many actors and content under its overview in order to 
act as a coordinator. It is also noted that the space of the EUSBSR is defined by 
the EU-member states around the Baltic Sea, not the countries of the Baltic Sea as 
such; this means that there is a difference between the imagined space of the 
region (the Baltic Sea) and the outreach of the institution at hand. It is possible that 
this explains some of the legitimacy issue for this regional spokesperson – that 
there seemingly is no definite connectivity between the region and the institution.  
The EUSBSR as presented, as a regional spokesperson, is quite sterile at first 
sight; defined as a tool for handling issues and creating possibilities in a common 
space. All the EU macro-regional strategies are developed based on the policy 
principle called ´three No´s´; no new institutions, no new legislation, and no new 
funding163. The space itself (determined by challenges 
and opportunities shared by EU member states which are in proximity to 
one another) and any there-to connected society seems glanced over: first when we 
look a step higher, to the EC, coordinators of the EUSBSR, can 
we discern certain values connected to a specific society or identity. Through the 
EC the society and identity that might be channelled in this region is a European 
idea.  
                                                                                                                                                            163 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the  European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Concerning the Added Value of Macro-regional Strategies, 2013 
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This perceived sterility and the possibly passive channelling of a society or 
identity has its explaining factors. The institution is a non-claimant to regional 
Baltic identity and maybe not even EU-identity though strategies of communication 
should point to EU legitimacy (ex: visible by putting the EU flag on produced 
material). EC/EUSBSR has a capacity, the institution claims space and it holds 
society based values (by redirection to the EU). Is it possible that functions can 
claim space and extended function? “Capacity” or “function” here relates to the 
ability of coordinating actors in a larger context and the heightened effectiveness 
that this contributes to; all in the name of EU.  
 Nordic profile: Spokesperson, Space and Strategy 
The Nordic or “Norden” spokesperson  
The Nordic Council is a geo-political inter-parliamentary forum for co-
operation between the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries or the Nordic are a 
geographical and cultural region in Northern Europe and the North Atlantic, where 
they are most commonly known as Norden (“the North”) and consists of 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, including Greenland and Faroe 
Islands—which are both constituent countries within the Kingdom of Denmark—
and the Åland Islands. It was formed after the Second World War (in 1952) to 
promote co-operation between the five Nordic countries. The Council consists of 87 
representatives from the countries and the autonomous territories, the autonomous 
territories have the same representation as states. In 1971 the Nordic Council of 
Ministers was formed as an intergovernmental forum, is responsible for inter-
parliamentary co-operation. While they are officially two different institutions they 
do share office, staff, and webpage. The Nordic Council of Ministers was 
established in 1971 to further integrate the intergovernmental cooperation between 
the countries of Norden. The two shall therefore be seen as “one” institution.  
The space of Norden has been under consideration from time to time. Two 
political processes have in past times proposed cooperation or unification between 
the states of this region; Political Scandinavism and Political Nordism. The Nordic 
council and Nordic council of ministers is an outcome of the later.   
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Political Scandinavism paralleled the 19th-century unification movements 
of Germany and Italy. As opposed to the German and Italian counterparts, the 
Scandinavian state-building project was not successful. Based on common ethnic, 
linguistic, political and cultural heritage, political Scandinavism  supported the idea 
of Scandinavia as a unified region or a single nation, countries Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden164 165. The Scandinavianism movement lost influence after the second 
Danish-German war over Schleswig, when the Swedish government refused to join 
an alliance against the rising German power on the continent.  
Political Nordism promoting civil cooperation between the Nordic countries and 
was introduced with the Nordic Association [Swedish: Föreningen Norden]. It 
started through Swedish initiatives in 1919 and is still active 
today.  Political Nordism  includes nurturing the sense of cultural affinity and, 
especially in the past, lobbying for open borders in the region166. Typical activities 
are related to rising the awareness about language, culture and social conditions in 
the Nordic countries. The movement also includes Finland, Iceland and the Danish 
territories Greenland and Faroe Islands and have an ideological base in Nordic 
economic co-operation and integration. Fields of cooperation include the job 
exchange program Nordjobb (an exchange programme that offers young people 
summer jobs in the Nordic countries) and town twinning between Nordic countries. 
The Nordic Association was a proponent for the establishment of the Nordic 
Council167.  
 
Nordic overlapping space  
Norden has an institutional design with specific and active content that let the 
Nordic countries act together and that that institution facilitates an agenda whereby 
they processes space and objects therein as one. Both the Nordic Council and the 
Nordic Council of Ministers have a number of partners and are active participants 
in other regional co-operations. The Nordic Council of Ministers has established 
                                                                                                                                                            164 Scandinavia, 2018 165 [Fun fact?] These three countries are referred to as "three brothers" in the sixth stanza of the national anthem of Norway. The Swedish anthem was written in the spirit of Scandinavism: “Du gamla, du fria”/ 
“Thou ancient, Thou free” was originally named “Sång till Norden”/ “Song to the 
North”; it puts Norden in centre and any mention of Sweden is not in the text).  166 Foreningen Norden, 2018 167 Foreningen Norden, 2018 
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four Offices outside the Nordic Region, namely in all the Baltic states - Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania - and the German state of Schleswig-Holstein. The Nordic 
Council and the Council of Ministers define Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia 
as “Adjacent Areas” and have formal cooperation with them under the Adjacent 
Areas policies framework. Since the early 1990s, Nordic cooperation has become 
more regional, European and international. There are also Nordic associations in 
Estonia, Latvia and Petrozavodsk in North-West Russia. While the traditional intra-
Nordic cooperation among the five Nordic countries has continued, the interaction 
with Norden´s adjacent areas in a larger European context has developed into an 
important element in the overall endeavours of the Nordic council and the Nordic 
council of ministers168. In recent years the cooperation has focused increasingly on 
Russia169. 
 
The overall strategy 
The later historical process of creation of the Nordic council, from the 50s and 
onwards has included numerous attempted institutional developments and a strong 
focus on cultural and identity projects and agendas.   
 
”[…] i början så gjorde man ju ganska många, tog man initiativ till ganska många 
betydelsefulla avtal. Vi har de här klassiska; passfrihet, gemensam arbetsmarknad och rätten att 
studera i varandras länder och rätten att bosätta sig i varandras länder utan 
uppehållstillstånd”170.  
 
“[…] in the beginning they initiated quite a few prominent treaties. We have these classic – free 
movement and open borders, right to work and study, the right to establish a living in each other 
countries without any visa”171. [The authors own translation] 
  
An attempt to create a Nordic defence league collapsed after external pressure 
by the two new super powers; the USA and Soviet, who did not want an alternative 
                                                                                                                                                            168 Etzold T, 2015:148pp 169 Etzold T, 2015:148pp 170 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 171 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 
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“block” in-between their spaces of influence since they preferred that everyone 
should pick a side (west or east) instead of alternatives172.  
The creation of the Nordic Passport Union was the start of the highly 
institutionalized free movement between the Nordic states. This free movement 
now includes a free right to study, to work or to live in whichever Nordic country 
you chose.   
During the seventies, a push for an economic and customs union was initiated. 
This push was stopped by Soviet on the grounds that they thought that Finland was 
getting too integrated into the West. Finland was made to abort this push, and after 
that the momentum cased. Mr. Lindblad claims that it was at this point that 
Danmark and Norway started looking towards the EG for economic cooperation173.   
 
”försöket på slutet av 60-talet att bilda en ekonomisk och tull-union mellan dom nordiska 
länderna. Och det var ju framförhandlat och i princip klart så att undertecknas det här avtalet, 
men åter igen så kom stormakter in och [...] Sovjetunionen tyckte att det här kan ju inte Finland 
vara med i - då blir man ju integrerad i Väst så det ville man ju inte. Då tvingades Finland 
hoppa av det och då gick liksom andan lite ur resten. Då sneglade Danmark och Norge ner mot 
Europeiska Gemenskapen”174. 
 
“By the end of the 60ties the Nordic countries tried to establish a trade union between 
themselves but once again the Great Powers [USA and Soviet] intervened. In the Soviet they 
thought that this was something that Finland could not join because it would integrate Finland 
in the west. Finland was forced to withdraw from the project and that brought the momentum 
down. Denmark and Norway began looking towards the European Community”175. [The 
authors own translation] 
 
Cooperation between the Nordic countries has in spite of external influence 
continued to evolve. The Nordic Council of Ministers was created in 1971 for direct 
governmental cooperation while the committees work on specific issues is done by 
the Nordic Council committees and by the executive body, the Presidium176, and 
                                                                                                                                                            172 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 173 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 174 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 175 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 176 About the Nordic Council committees, 2017 
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together the two institutions have continued to work to achieve “Nordic usefulness” 
[writers own translation of “Nordisk nytta”]. Another rule for Nordic cooperation 
through these channels are the principle of consensus which results in that the only 
work that can be done is the work on which they all agree177.  
The overall strategy of the Nordic council of ministers has recently been 
specified in a strategy document: Internasjonal strategi for Nordisk råd 2018–
2022178.  It leaves little room for which strategy the Nordic council places its bets 
on: cooperation is a ground pillar and the organisation is the platform on which it is 
carried out. Only when pressed by the volatility of Russian international policy has 
this policy seen changes (See interview with Torkil). “Action Plan for Cooperation 
between the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council 2018 – 2019”179 is a document 
confirming that cooperation is the rule and strategy for how the Nordic/Baltic 
relationship is formed.  
 
“The Baltic and Nordic countries are linked regionally, politically and economically. 
Cooperation of the Baltic and Nordic countries is grounded in shared values, mutual trust and 
solidarity. Cooperation of the Baltic and Nordic countries is a symbol of success”180. 
 
The main common interests are sustainability, security, growth and welfare of 
“the Region”. The action plan also gives us the recipe for how the two regions 
regard themselves as “one” – “The Baltic–Nordic region is characterised by 
credibility, development, sustainability and dialogue. Baltic–Nordic regional 
relationship, shared values and common interests provide a unique platform to face 
current challenges and build a common future”. This is the core of its "us" or 
outward “branding” of one region and thus also the basis for what values it would 
have to reflect upon when interacting with someone “other”. The action plan, 
formed between two different regions with much in common, once again points out 
that they have realized that acting together strengthen themselves in relationship to 
“others”, external actors, such as Russia and the EU. These are strategies that have 
been pointed out in the conducted interviews also.                                                                                                                                                              177 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 178 Nordisk råd – Internasjonal strategi for Nordisk råd 2018-2022, 2017  179 Action Plan for Cooperation between the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council 2018 – 2019, 2017  180 Action Plan for Cooperation between the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council 2018 – 2019, 2017  
  63 
The Nordic/Baltic cooperation is extensive and long lasting and it has by both 
parties been celebrated and called a “win-win-situation”181. In comment on the 25-
year celebration it was noted that the cooperation between the two regions had 
begun even already when the Soviet Union began to fall:  
 
“Nordic observers followed events closely and with a growing level of involvement. There was a 
strong sense of solidarity with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as support for their 
aspirations for independence and democracy. It was no surprise, then, when the Nordic and 
Baltic regions began to co-operate on a practical level before independence was a reality. 
The Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers were pursuing the idea of 
establishing information centres in the Baltic countries as early as the autumn of 1990. There 
was broad consensus on this, and the council of ministers opened offices in Riga, Tallinn, and 
Vilnius in early 1991. Consequently, this year we are celebrating not only 25 years of Baltic 
independence, but also 25 years of co-operation between our regions”182.  
 
Their cooperation has changed over time and at the outset the Nordic-Baltic co-
operation was characterised by the establishing of contacts, as well as promoting 
Nordic culture and social values across the Baltic region. After the Baltic countries 
joined the EU in 2004, it was decided that co-operation should be on equal terms 
and guidelines were adopted that form the basis of today’s Nordic-Baltic co-
operation. Policy areas for which guidelines was adopted includes cross-border co-
operation; gender equality, research, and innovation; co-operation on social affairs 
and health; and the environment and sustainable development183. 
 
”Det främsta värdet [med Nordiska rådet] skulle jag säga är det nätverk som uppstår mellan 
parlamentariker i de nordiska länderna, asså att man känner varandra kors och tvärs. 
Parlamentariker går ju in och ut ur regeringar och både tidigare ministrar och parlamentariker 
upprättar personliga band på tvärs över gränserna”184.  
 
“The greatest value in the Nordic Council I would say is the network that appears between 
members of parliament of the different Nordic countries – one gets to know each other. 
                                                                                                                                                            181 Nordic-Baltic co-operation – a 25-year success story, 2016 182 Nordic-Baltic co-operation – a 25-year success story, 2016 183 Nordic-Baltic co-operation – a 25-year success story, 2016 184 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 
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Parliamentarians’ moves in and out of the governments and bot ministers and parliamentarians 
establish personal bonds across the borders”185. [The authors own translation] 
5.3.1 Noted observations and questions regarding the Nordic case: 
Actor dependent structure? Two institutions one region 
The Nordic council and the Council of Ministers are the institutions that have 
developed for the Nordic region to be able to work as one but at the same time 
remaining highly independent. This has let the countries to select divergent 
strategies in international politics while integrating on the issues they find it 
important to cooperate on as one. This “one” institution is found highly legitimate 
as a structure for the region. The Nordic region repeatedly draws both suggestions 
of added space (new members; Scotland and the three Baltic states have applied for 
membership186) and added functions (has gone through four phases of institutional 
direction187). It is possible that this region still can develop into something more, 
and has tried so in the past, but larger interests (the USA and Soviet) has influenced 
these possibilities. The Nordic region is a voice-full region where the institution 
helps coordinating its actors' joint interests into a stronger voice outward: e.g. it has 
pushed for an international ban on mercury and is a strong normative spokesperson 
on areas such as environment and human values.   
 
Language border 
There is a space of language that fixates “Baltic” as not “Nordic”. The subject 
of “language” has been mentioned in different contexts and referring to a (this far) 
imagined possibility that the “Nordic” of the day should be expanded to a 
“Nordic/Baltic” constellation.  
The language border has been overcome before when Finland was included in 
the Nordic region constellation. Additional connections drew the then 
geographically Scandinavia-bound Nordic to include an added space of Finland 
(this space was perceived as “Baltic” due to the main language spoken there). These 
                                                                                                                                                            185 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 186 Johan Lindblad, 2017-12-06 187 Sundelius, B. and Wiklund, C. 2017 
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connections can presumably be narrowed down to the history that Sweden and 
Finland share. The same historical connections exist between Sweden and Estonia, 
though that was severed much earlier. The language connection that Finland and 
Estonia has is also an argument for Estonia to have a deeper connection to the 
Nordic than the other Baltic States. Despite this, there is no indication that the 
inclusion of the Baltic states as a whole (nor Estonia in particular) is about to 
become a reality. While other arguments have been raised in opposition to a 
“Nordic/Baltic” constellation, like questions of stability in the Baltic region and 
economic development compared between Nordic and Baltic States, the lasting 
argument of two different spaces is the language barrier. However, in the interview 
with Sørensen a potential paradigm change of the Nordic/Baltic language space was 
hypostasised: it was noted that the language dynamics are changing188. Younger 
generations are using English for inter-Nordic communication. This would possibly 
change the policy of having “Nordic” as the working language for Nordic 
cooperation and it could therefor also remove this weighted oppositional argument 
against a “Nordic/Baltic” constellation. Time will tell if this scenario comes to be.  
 
EU 
The EU is an integrate object of the regions studied. Most of the Nordic 
countries are members as is, since 2004, also the Baltic States. The institutionalized 
relationships between Nordic/EU and Baltic/EU placed the EU as an integrated 
external partner with whom much cooperation takes place and experiences shared 
through joint projects. Nothing in the interviews does support the notion that the 
EU as a region is coming to dominate the agendas or content of neither the Nordic 
nor Baltic regions; rather it is pointed out that they have found purpose to 
strengthen their internal cooperation so to better influence the EU. The dynamics 
with EU both as a partner and as an object of regional space can be said to function 
on a win-win exchange where cooperation brings added value; values in forms of 
experience, funding and a more streamlined dynamics with neighbours.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            188 Torkil Sørensen, 2018-02-06 
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Nordic cooperation with Russia  
The council had several offices in the Baltic countries and in Russia. These 
offices were built for representation of the Nordic countries, to build networks with 
national authorities and organisations, and to find opportunities for co-operation189. 
Russia later labelled Nordic council of ministers employees in Russia as “foreign 
agents” and made it very difficult for the Nordic council to work in Russia. Because 
of this, the Nordic council of ministers later chose to close down their offices in 
Russia; offices which for many years had worked on cultural co-operation between 
the Nordic countries and Russia and sought to strengthen ties between the countries' 
civilian populations. One example of how this has been perceived in the Nordic 
region is the response issued by former Norwegian state secretary Tore Hattrem, 
2015-10-26, in his opening address at a conference 26 October 2015 on Russia and 
the Nordic Countries: 
 
“After being branded in such a way, there is no reason for us to continue our activities at this 
time,” Carsten Hansen, the minister for Nordic co-operation, told DR Nyheder. All of the 
group’s activities in northwest Russia have been suspended “indefinitely“”190. 
 
These developments prompted a change of strategy for how the Nordic/Russia 
relationship should be addressed. 
 
“Our Russia policy follows a dual track: On the one side defending our values and principles - 
loud and clear, if need be. And on the other side seeking pragmatic and practical cooperation of 
mutual interest. [...] The answer is Russia’s actions in Ukraine and worsening conditions for 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. We will, however, continue practical cooperation 
where we have common interest. A deep political cooperation will require a return to common 
values and the path of international law. [...] By engaging in cooperation, promoting people-to-
people contact, supporting civil societies and respecting human rights, we contribute to trust, 
peace and security in our part of the world”191.  
                                                                                                                                                            189 Nordic ministers close Russian office, Council decides to leave Saint Petersburg after Russian authorities brand them as spies, 2015 190 Nordic ministers close Russian office, Council decides to leave Saint Petersburg after Russian authorities brand them as spies, 2015 191 Russia and the Nordic Countries – Relations and Cooperations, Oslo, Lysebu, 26 October 2015, 2015 
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In this change of approach, we can observe that Hattrem formulates a fifth 
alternative on how one can strategize in response towards others. “On the one 
side defending our values and principles - loud and clear, if need be. And on the 
other side seeking pragmatic and practical cooperation of mutual interest”192 is a 
strict and actively passive position which still invites to conditional cooperation 
with the second parties.  
Ukraine is a subject of importance when it comes to cooperation with Russia. 
The Crimea crisis, started in February 2014, marks Russia as a security threat to 
both Nordic and Baltic States and it has led to a breach of trust. Cooperation is 
hampered and inflamed when Ukraine is part of the “dynamics at hand”. Interviews 
with persons connected to the CBSS and the Nordic council remark that the 
cooperation related to the Baltic sea area and states are close to this subject and that 
this is not equally so when cooperation concerns the Artic region. The Artic 
Council is further away, which there leaves Ukraine at lesser relevancy to the 
agenda and it is easier to keep that issue “low key” when working together.  
                                                                                                                                                            192 Russia and the Nordic Countries – Relations and Cooperations, Oslo, Lysebu, 26 October 2015, 2015 
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6 Discussion and Theory development 
What is this ´overlapping space`? How do regions strategize about `overlapping´? 
How does `overlapping space` affect regionalization?  Processes and mechanisms 
are the makings of theory and theory consists of plausible relationships proposed 
among concepts and sets of concepts. The correlation of different sources has 
revealed institutional differences between the three case regions as institutional 
spokespersons, a clear picture of how the regions regard one another, and of how 
they chose to strategize in an overlapping space193.  
In the text following, the structure of this chapter will handle the research 
questions one by one to start with. Through this process, attention is drawn to 
certain aspects of the regionalization process itself: one additional question that 
arise is what function actually drives regionalization along – can Paasi´s “historical 
process”, how the phases of regionalization moves from phase one till phase four, 
be defined? 
 What is this `overlapping space`? 
Each regional spokesperson body collect actors from a largely shared space; many 
of the countries included in one region are also included in the other region. Each 
regional spokesperson collects agendas and issues (objects in space) that are either 
shared or has a direct counterpart in the other region: each region has an economic 
focus, political agenda and at the very least try to relate to a specific society to draw 
legitimacy from. This shared spaces and shared objects to which they all relate 
makes for regional spokespersons with overlapping space.  
                                                                                                                                                            193 (Motive analysis was not necessary to use to draw conclusions since no contradicting motivations regarding cooperation between regional spokespersons were found). 
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The conceptualization on `overlapping space´ held together through the 
analysation process. The hypothesis presented possible strategies for how regions 
might act in overlapping space and towards each other. The analysis has presented a 
fifth “unforeseen” strategy but even so that strategy can be explained with available 
knowledge of the concepts and mechanisms of regions and space. This 
conceptualization grasps the essentials of the dynamics of a space of regions and 
predicts possible ways of regional strategies for how to approach “the other”. The 
overlapping space of regions can therefore be defined as:  
 
1) The happenstance that two regions, or more, share the same space and that 
that space is also defined by the same object (subject or issue). The regional 
spokespersons of each regional space have self-specified agendas and interests in 
common with each other and therefore have to consider the other regional 
spokesperson.  
2) The same space would be included in the regions idea of "self", of such 
consistency that it is part of the regions idea of their imagined space. That the 
regions share space is not enough for the space to be `overlapping space´, in that 
space there must be an object that both share; an object of subject relevant to both 
regions. This can be a single issue, problem or resource.  
3) This “object” in shared space must be of such nature that it is more than just 
fleeting; this gives time to the interactions of regions which would be necessary for 
the ideas of society and identity to react.   
 
As this conceptualization of `overlapping space´ did capture the essential and 
relevant mechanisms of time, space and regionalization processes the hypothesis, 
too, was quite accurate: that that regional strategizing is a collective output of 
relational dynamics (`us` and `them´) and therefore there are limited options for 
strategizing.  
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 How do regions strategize about `overlapping 
space´? 
The “profiling” of the cases, enables an appreciation of the tendencies that indicate 
how the regions act in this overlapping space: 
 
1; “Including space”:  
Spaces of relevant parties with shared object are included: EC/EUSBSR 
includes additional space (seeks cooperation outside its own sphere) when the 
actors of that additional space share the same object and when there is added value 
to cooperation. The inclusion of others (´us´ and ´them´) and the lasting 
overlapping over time of both space and objects create grounds for interaction and 
learning opportunities. This strategy also creates an extended space for collaborated 
policies which furthers the span of influence of specific policies and objects. 
In “Including space” the regions choose to complement each other; space is 
shared if the objects or values there in are the same. This is clearly visible when it 
comes to shared values and on agendas such as human trafficking and 
environmental issues. 
Extended space for policies means collaboration and negotiation over values. 
One can view this space as quite soft and thus borders become fuzzy. The different 
definitions of these separate spaces might meld. 
 
2; “Excluding space”:   
Russia has been pointed out as ´other´ – another region with which cooperation 
is struggling. There is a border between Russia, the other spaces of the Baltic Sea 
and the North. This border is less soft than others we have come across in this study 
and “objects” are not shared over this border as they are in other happenstances of 
this overlapping space.  
With an “Excluding space”, the space extension of certain policies will not 
reach across the borders of where the policy emerged. Values don’t easily extend 
over such borders as across others; in turn cooperation will be more of an effort to 
achieve.  
  71 
 
3; “Including objects”:  
Helping each other out with different types of issues would be to lend strength 
to one another as specific points in time and on certain objects. Cooperation on 
single issue subjects is to include objects momentarily.  
The regions share experiences and knowledge where added value might be 
found (this is evident in all interviews): if there are ideas (objects) that might add 
value to more than one region (space) then, relating to the regions general strategy 
of cooperation, the regional spokespersons will welcome said idea and incorporate 
that idea, or at least think it through for themselves. This could be viewed as an 
example of how the objects can be said to have a space of their own.  
This object-specific space might be shared with different regional 
spokespersons when cooperation bring added value. While momentary cooperation 
does not include or extend “space” (and therefore, does not blurs boundaries) the 
added value, it strengthen each institution.  
 
4; “Excluding objects”:  
The EC/EUSBSR has a low connectivity to the space of the Baltic Sea which 
limits their institution – It works with a defined set of restrictions of it capacities 
with the ´three NOs` as a coordinating function. The ´three NOs` can indicate that 
the EC/EUSBSR restricts itself as that could be a possibly harmful over-ambition 
for an institution that has yet to implant a steady connection from the region.  
There is no “same” identity shared between the Baltic Sea and the Nordic which 
puts the field of “identity” slightly to the side when they interact, but overall values 
are much the same which makes transitions of objects easy between their spaces. 
The exclusion of certain objects from cooperation in general has (in this case 
study) not been a sign of avert motivations but of a sign a lack of added value.  
 
5; “The unforeseen”: 
The occurrence of the Crimean crisis did shake relations extensively and in 
response towards Russia the Nordic countries chose a fifth, by me unpredicted, 
strategy for regional cooperation in overlapping space: “Our Russia policy follows 
a dual track: On the one side defending our values and principles - loud and clear, 
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if need be. And on the other side seeking pragmatic and practical cooperation of 
mutual interest“194.  
 
As a strategy, this can possibly be considered as a clear boundary between two 
regions which are open for cooperation, but under strict terms of the objects 
exchanged over that border. This 5th, the “dual track”, combined strains from 
different strategies in order to hold open the Nordic space for cooperation with 
Russia, under restrictions related to value-adherence. Russia had broken the rules of 
the game and it was not appreciated.  
 How does `overlapping space` affect 
regionalization?   
There are few limitations in the connectivity between regional spokespersons. 
Therefore, the regional spokespersons strive to cooperate where there are, or can 
become, added value to shared space and objects therein. A general choice of 
strategy in the overlapping spaces of the Baltic Sea region is an inclusion of both 
space and object whenever possible.  
When the regions choose to complement each other, momentarily or not, the 
space between them is soft which results in fuzzy borders. Depending on the degree 
of cooperation and time, these borders can evaporate or the spaces can merge. 
Exclusion is rare in this overlapping space of regions. When they occur it is a 
result of either value differences between ´us´ and ´them´ or, of lasting historic 
borders where objects are not shared.  
There were two strategies that differed from the norm of inclusion of both space 
and object for added value. First, in the case of regional identity: while both the 
Baltic Sea Region and the Nordic region share space and both regions have the 
same object (identity) connected to this overlapping space, it is not shared; policies 
and work programs on the object are held apart from the regions. However, while 
                                                                                                                                                            194 Russia and the Nordic Countries – Relations and Cooperations, Oslo, Lysebu, 26 October 2015, 2015 
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there is this border of identity between the regions they still share knowledge and 
experiences on the subject with another. This is definite evidence of how regional 
spokespersons strategizing in overlapping space strive to benefit from the “other´s” 
existence. Second, the only “other” where the border between spaces was both 
space- and object-exclusive was the Russia. With the 5th strategy, even this case the 
selected strategy strived to include the other.  
Inherent values of a policy determine what space that policy can cover with 
legitimacy of its own. Values connect to identity, identity is space- and actor bound 
and both actors and identity are limited by space. Perhaps added value of 
cooperation ads less where the shared objects of shared space are fewer. However, 
times do change: before 1991 there was a clear border between two definite regions 
or “social spheres”. The iron curtain fell and new shifts will come with time.  
6.3.1 Notions to ponder  
“Theory consists of plausible relationships proposed among concepts and sets of concepts 
(though only plausible, its plausibility is to be strengthened through continued research)”195.  
 Theory developing activities includes both the finding explaining factors 
(suggesting complementing explaining factors or about competing explaining 
factors) and the aim to develop causal mechanisms with the ambition to better 
understand a specific phenomenon of interest, how it works and what it affects. The 
theoretical grounding of this thesis has been heavy, reviewing concepts and 
mechanisms of regionalization theory. The research questions have been aimed at 
developing a new concept in this context of previous research; the questions were 
not aimed at suggesting a missing theoretical function. The concept of “overlapping 
space” deliberates an area of regionalization processes not previously dwelt on. The 
analysis thereof lets one see the regionalization process from a different 
perspective. “Overlapping space” lets us review the mechanisms of the 
regionalization processes and their function. It also questions how regions should 
                                                                                                                                                            195 Strauss A, and Corbin J, 1994:278 
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be viewed. Are they regions which have interests or, differently, as policies and 
interests that have space?   
The institutional characters of the spokesperson-bodies of the EC/EUSBSR, the 
CBSS and the ´Nordic` do differ significantly in some aspects: the EC/EUSBSR 
can be said to have entered the region as a supra-governmental institution (“Who´s” 
“society” /identity that lie at the core of their regional idea is unclear; is it a region 
of Europe or of the Baltic Sea that they promote?), the CBSS is a newly formed 
intergovernmental institution, while the Nordic has a long history and is a voice-full 
actor but its institution is close to actor dependent or “co-governmental”.  
Does Paasi´s “historical process” in actuality describe the slow working 
progress of identity formation? And is “identity” (by extension) a core object in 
determining “legitimacy” of a region? 
 
A “Density of Space”? 
With regions that share practices and also share objects, can we talk about such 
a thing as “density of overlapping space” (density as a number of shared objects 
and practices)? Logically – yes, we definitely can. Is growing density a sign of 
aligning (or even merging) regions? Aligning, yes, I would say so (especially in 
terms of policies, economic interests and social values), but as merging? No – as an 
expressions of societies, regions are still depending on the definition of ´us` and 
´them`. Without examining this defining social aspect, drawing that conclusion 
would be to go too far. However (conscious or unconscious) the probability of 
circumventions between distinction of ´us` and ´them` can be assumed to reflect the 
density in the overlapping space.  
Regions, as the end function of a “social calculation”, take time to form. By the 
formation of social discourse of what they could should be the discourse could 
hurry the process on. Through an overlapping social space – where knowledge is 
shared and where common tools/practices are beginning to become developed 
through the interaction of more than one region – the conscious or unconscious 
developed idea of ´us` is likely to occur faster. This should be the case when the 
regions reinforce any singular identity a region without a distinction of ´them` 
towards the other regions with which it overlaps. Actors of such a climate would 
transcend “internal” boundaries easily and experience a “fuzzing” out of the 
boundaries between the overlapping regions. It would also become natural that they 
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act together on an increasing number of issues, as in the case of the Russian ´other` 
and the Crimean crisis.  
 
Regions Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 
Is there a controversy about regions being formations of bottom-up or top-down 
processes: are both possibilities of equal theoretical functionality?  
The theory of Passi describes the region as a construction of the society which 
imagined it. It is formed through four distinct phases, by a bottom-up historical 
process. Can the mechanisms and functions be put separately; can the region come 
into existence top-down? If the theory is jumbled this way, the `historical process´; 
is lost and replaced with some other kind of “yeast” that still produces regions and 
regional spokespersons.  
The analysed cases have different organizational structures that did not always 
follow the bottom-up historical process: they have different historical backgrounds 
(origins of the idea of “us”), and different solidity in their imagined space today. 
The EU/EUSBSR was implemented top down. While lifted up as a regional 
spokesperson by Metzger and Schmitt that role was downplayed by the interview 
subject. It was observed that legitimacy is low because of the distance between the 
main institution (EC) and the region society; this in turn has the EUSBSR to limits 
their capacity for cooperation. The CBSS is also new but can be said to be “created 
from the middle” which would be the states of the region reaching out to one 
another to face joint problems more than being joint since earlier (not grass-root nor 
top down). They have common grounds and a vague society base that they try to 
extend into something more. The Nordic is a region that has connected itself 
throughout a long period of time. It is regarded as one of the most integrated 
regions of the world and yet an institutional format which has had to adapt to 
external influence and is restricted by a strong will for independence of its actors.  
Processes towards regionalization as seldom streamlined, but generally marked 
by strife and struggle over the right to determine the ascribed boundaries and 
substance of a certain regionalization196. The spatial formation processes are a 
struggle for the ability to define space and objects. If one accepts that the 
                                                                                                                                                            196 Metzger J. and Schmitt P, 2011:267 
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EC/EUSBSR as a regional spokesperson then, this seems like a case which only 
slightly adheres to Paasi´s regionalization theory. EC/EUSBSR had no “society” of 
its own in its designated region. An institution was formed from up above onto an 
idea of a space and with just a few restricted capacities. These capacities were 
defined from above to address certain issues of a specific space. It can possibly be 
argued that as a regional spokesperson it is only legitimized by these issues through 
the ability of its functions/ capacities. So argued there is no historical process 
through which has designed its space or agenda. However, there is legitimacy and 
function. A conclusion then is that functions/ capacities connected to an institution 
can create legitimacy. Is “legitimacy” the same yeast as the “historical process”? 
6.3.2 Legitimacy  
Legitimacy isn´t a prominent feature in neither Paasi´s nor Metzger and Schmitt 
writings but it is arguably the missing mechanism which can explain how the 
process of regionalization finds momentum to go through the phases of regional 
construction. Legitimacy could work as a driving force between Paasi´s four 
phases; making one areal or territorial delineation more likely accepted by a 
specific society than another, making one conceptual or symbolic formulation more 
closely related to that society. The conditions for legitimacy defines the form of the 
institutional establishment and, finally rules whether the region is or isn’t 
acceptance as an areal entity. Legitimacy as a mechanism could be the ruling stick 
by which the regionalization process stimulates one version of the region or its 
passing.  
How would legitimacy work as a driving force? Tentatively; society is key. 
Legitimacy is created by functionality and distinction, functionality of addressing 
issues and distinctions by objects to differ “us” from “them”. An institution taking 
on the role of a regional spokesperson needs legitimacy to back its claim. 
Institutions “carving out” its vision of a region need to legitimize it too. The more 
one vision of “what should be” is embraced by a society the more probable it is that 
vision both become and to last.  Legitimacy could be harnessed by a function – an 
institutional capacity to meet a need (as the CBSS was formed to meet a need for 
communication and joint efforts in a new political space or as how the 
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EC/EUSBSR is a forum for coordination and a voice for the Baltic Sea region 
towards the EU). If an idea lacks legitimacy it would result in exclusion (like how 
one group of countries/actors belong to another language group or how their 
economy is not stable enough). It is also possible that any institution with 
credibility could legitimately add additional functions (institutional capacity), 
staking claim or a bigger role, and it could be the means by which the rules of the 
games are changed.  
 
Driving force behind of regionalization – Legitimacy? 
Institutional capacity+ => 1) Institution legitimacy+ 2) Added capacity 
Idea of something = legitimacy of this something 
Institution not functioning => less legitimacy and eventual removal of capacity 
or of institution as a whole? 
 
EUSBSR is held back from “becoming more” though its lack of legitimacy 
(three No´s, and how firm they are in their specific function as a coordinator). 
Arguably the EUSBSR´s restricted function in the Baltic sea/Nordic spaces is due 
to lack of connectivity to the “us” (identity) of the region. The Nordic and CBSS 
present themselves with a strong value base from which they draw legitimacy to 
focus on why they are needed actors in their space. “Branding” is done to create 
legitimacy for without legitimacy they would not continue functioning in the roles 
that have defined themselves and the space they represent. If the EC/EUSBSR do 
what they do well, then it is possible that institutional change will come, ex; 
removal the three NO´s. Then the EC/EUSBSR can evolve into a regional 
spokesperson with a larger agenda, an active proponent for EU-society connected 
values of the region.  
The Nordic has a very strong connectivity to its region. It has evolved over a 
long time and the process behind it is definitely historical and includes economic 
unions, defence agreements and policy cooperation on a wide range of fields. 
However, The Nordic Federation has not emerged, in spite of a continuous 
production of articles with titles which includes themes like: “It is possible”197, 
                                                                                                                                                            197 En nordisk union är möjlig. 2016 
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“Why don’t we?”198, and “That’s why it should be done”199 which points out how 
strong the region is economically and how much the Nordic countries have in 
common, and that in this insecure world security can be found in the Nordic 
community. The long-lasting call for deeper integration of the Nordic states faces 
the problem of having little impact. This is due to the lack of one unison idea of 
what the separate Nordic states would found their furthered cooperation on. The 
Nordic states seem to hold their individual independence very close to heart and the 
vision of a Nordic federation is too controversial to be accepted. Also, as was 
mentioned in one of the interviews with the representatives of the Nordic Council, 
past notions of this idea has been shouted down by larger external powers: the USA 
and the Soviet did not which for a new large and strong entity between them. The 
legitimacy in the idea of a single Nordic state has not been strong enough to push 
against the difficulties of producing that possible future. 
The conceptualization of ´overlapping space` noted that the regions must share 
not only space but also objects, factors or issues, which concern both regions – seen 
another way these objects have a space of their own. If these objects calls for actors 
to address them (like how the need to supervise a heavily trafficked sea rout and the 
issues related to this task calls for many actors/nations to be part of the 
administrating process), this object would do so within a specific space where the 
object is a shared issue. An institution could likely be set up to address this specific 
object in its space. While this scenario shares some features of how regions develop 
in Paasi´s regionalization theory, this object, its space and its institution is not a 
region. The institution would need to aspire to branch out – through its own devise 
to reach for added function: if the space (within which it has its purpose and 
function) held more objects with issues needed addressing, this institution could 
possibly claim relevance as an institution with capacity. Such a claim would need to 
involve both “legitimacy” and “function” (institutional capacity) for the claim to 
possibly be confirmed.  
Seen this way, one single policy institution could be a seed for the process of 
creating a region independently on any bottom-up or top-down perspective, even by 
stepping in “from the middle”. Legitimacy could be the mechanism which makes                                                                                                                                                             198 Varför bildar vi inte en nordisk union?, 2017 199 Därför ska de nordiska länderna bilda en union, 2017 
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the regionalization process move from one phase to the other by confronting 
perceived issues and presenting solutions. An institution with a functional response 
to a seen object or issue finds legitimacy.  
The EUSBSR is partly defined by its function as an administrating body 
without inherent substance, and administrative tool of soft space, that cannot claim 
legitimacy as it is now to draw onto itself additional functions or through such a 
different role as an actor in the space it is institutionalized. The way an institution 
could reach out and claim added institutional capacity can possibly be suggested by 
the theory of Multi Level Governance (MGL).  
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7 Conclusions 
What is `overlapping space`? – The conceptualization on what the overlapping 
space is, held together through the analysing process. This conceptualization 
grasped the essentials of the dynamics of a space of regions and helped predict 
possible ways of regional strategies for how to approach “the other”. The 
overlapping space of regions can therefore be defined as: 
  
1) The happenstance that two regions, or more, share the same space and that that 
space is also defined by the same object (subject or issue). The regional 
spokespersons of each regional space have self-specified agendas and interests in 
common with each other and therefore have to consider the other regional 
spokesperson.  
 
2) The same space would be included in the regions idea of "self", of such 
consistency that it is part of the regions idea of their imagined space. That the 
regions share space is not enough for the space to be `overlapping space´, in that 
space there must be an object that both share; an object of subject relevant to both 
regions. This can be a single issue, problem or resource. 
 
3) This “object” in shared space must be of such nature that it is more than just 
fleeting; this gives time to the interactions of regions which would be necessary 
for the ideas of society and identity to react.   
 
How do regions strategize about `overlapping space´? – The resolute stances 
these regional spokespersons have in favour of cooperation on shared subjects do 
not hint at my conceptualization of overlapping space being wrong. The hypothesis 
was confirmed and its predicted dynamics checks out as far as seen. In addition to 
the four basic strategies that were drawn up, the unforeseen 5th strategy was found 
when we viewed how the Nordic chose to handle a changing political climate in 
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regards to the Crimea conflict. This 5th strategy combined strains from different 
strategies in order to hold open the Nordic space for cooperation with Russia, but 
under restrictions relating to values.  
The concept of “overlapping space” exists. It is a factor of regional space and 
regions do strategize about it. The strategy that these regional spokespersons strive 
for is to cooperate where added value can be found. Where a lesser degree of 
cooperation emerges it indicates borders between “us” and “them” which are 
clearer.  
 
How does `overlapping space` affect regionalization? – The strategy favoured by 
the regions studied here was that of cooperation. The overlapping space of regions 
around the Baltic Sea can be called friendly and open. The theoretical implication 
of overlapping space is that their cooperation has the potential to soften boundaries 
and easing up space for the inclusion of new objects or actors. The regions are 
learning from each other to bolster efficiencies and to spread their values.  
The cooperation between regions has been referred to as Win-Win deals where 
learning and wider understanding of problems and solutions are shared. This win-
win situation opens up the ability to make more gains from a limited amount of 
resources – even if the object “identity” is not shared between the regions they can 
still learn what works or what doesn’t. With that mind-set for cooperation, the 
regions can also find ways to draw value out of cooperation even in that space the 
two regions do not share. 
The added value of cooperation is not held within the overlapping space but 
possibly exceeds, or nullifies, differences between spatial scales. Multilevel 
government (MGL) exists outside set spatial scales and brings shared issues to the 
same table.  
Identity does not necessarily merge through their work – though, since identity 
can co-exist, an identity might spread or identities might merge; finding fundament 
in space and thus add more or lose legitimacy for its region. 
 
“Sectoral Regions Theory” – Legitimacy is a mechanism of the regionalization 
process, possibly even the driving force. This fact nullifies the bottom-up rule of 
the “historical process”. As a result we can construct a “Sectoral Regions Theory”. 
Regions can be constructed in other ways then described by Paasi: the concepts of 
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the phases are all there but they can be jumbled up, put together differently. 
Legitimacy is not only drawn from the identities of societies but also from the 
functions (institutional capacity) or objects of the institution. It is likely that both 
the objects´ an institution or regional spokesperson represent, and the agenda it 
holds, do have legitimacy of its own. Both the functions that the institution offers to 
its space, and actors therein, carries legitimacy. The “yeast” of regionalization need 
not be initiated by a historical process and the bottom-up perspective of Paasi´s four 
phase´s does not have to be certain. An institution could be connected to a specific 
issue. The institution could branch out to reach for added function: if the space 
(within which it has its purpose and function) held more objects with issues needed 
addressing, this institution could claim relevance as an institution with capacity. 
Such a claim needs to involve both “legitimacy” and “function” (institutional 
capacity) for the claim to possibly be confirmed. A single-policy institution could 
be a seed for the process of creating a region independently on any bottom-up or 
top-down perspective, even by stepping in “from the middle”. Legitimacy could be 
the mechanism which makes the regionalization process move from one phase to 
the other by confronting perceived issues and presenting solutions. An institution 
with a functional response to a seen object or issue finds legitimacy.   
The regions work together to confront perceived spatial issues and presenting 
spatial solutions in order to be more efficient, and to add both institutional capacity 
and legitimacy to their space. `Overlapping space´ is a resource where different 
regions have shared values and are able to cooperate. This facilitates a win-win 
strategy. When conflict emerges or when the value gap between regions widen, the 
cooperation falter and the border between them gets sharpened, space hardens (as 
was seen in the case of Nordic/Baltic and Russia fewer objects of the same space 
are shared between them). The occurrence of the Crimean crisis did shake relations 
extensively and in response towards Russia the Nordic countries chose a 5th and 
unforeseen strategy for regional cooperation in overlapping space: “Our Russia 
policy follows a dual track: On the one side defending our values and principles - 
loud and clear, if need be. And on the other side seeking pragmatic and practical 
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cooperation of mutual interest”200. As a strategy, this can possibly be considered a 
clear boundary but open for cooperation, on the terms of that boundary. It should be 
safe to assume that there are other versions of these “dual track”-strategies.  
  
                                                                                                                                                            200 Russia and the Nordic Countries – Relations and Cooperations, Oslo, Lysebu, 26 October 2015, 2015 
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9 Annex 
As you might recall my RQs are: (1) What is this overlapping space?, (2) How do regions stratergize about ´overlapping´?, and (3) How does this affect regionalization?  The questions I have come to think about while reading up on space are of the kind alike: What are the regions assets that they use? What are the regions affected by? What makes up my cases ´space´? What are the objects of their space? What are this spaces constituents? Do the regions have a concrete consciousness regarding their space & spatiality/ locality?     Trying to get away from the abstract and towards some more mutually understandable questions leads me to try to make them talk more on their own about their region and the organisation that they work within.  Asking them to tell me about their region and its organisation  What is their region - how do they find the organisation connected to the region  What do they focus on as an organisation  What is their purpose   What are their resources/ tools in their different ventures, and for their organisation in general    After questions like those I was thinking to ask them about a specific region /if there is a region with which they have a developed cooperation, what for, in what ways and if this is only beneficial to them both.  
 Interview Peter Schenk (EC/EUSBSR) 
Interview with Peter Schenk (European Commission, Director General for Regional and Urban Policy – Competence Centre Macro-region and European Territorial Cooperation – EUSBSR), conducted 2016-06-30 trough Skype.   Q is for "question" and always asked by Ulf Friberg.  A is for "Answer" and always given by the person interviewed, this time by Peter Schenk.  -----  Q: I was thinking about what you describing to me what the EUSBSR do and its constitution, the parts that constitutes the Baltic Sea Region.  A: Jaa, I mean, it is a, I mean the Baltic, you mean very general what the strategy does? And how this is constituted in a wat, how it works?  Q: Yeah, and which areas you consider what the strategy applies to.  A: Yea, I mean the, you mean geographical areas or thematic?  Q: Thematic.  A: Yeah, uhm, I mean it´s... the reason why the strategy. The main rationale for the strategy, why it was created is that you have member states around the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), EU member states identified common challenges and common opportunity which could be best tackled at the BSR; so for which issues for which the member state is to small an entity and the EU 28 
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is to large. So something in-between so it is a very, it is a clearly defined geographical area, you have; to give you an example of course; it is the ecological state of the Baltic Sea, that is obviously identified as a problem that could only be solved when if all Baltic Sea states jointly take effort to improve the state of the ecological state of the Baltic Sea. So that in principal the rational and then it is also, you could also look at common challenges but also opportunities I mean. If you look at the economic growth, at research, at education, so many, transport, energies, security, lot of transport connections in the Baltic Sea: a lot of issues where it was considered that this could best be dealt with at the level of the member states around the Baltic Sea. So that was, lets say, initial rationale for creating this first macro-regional strategy. Now, as you might know, there are others which has followed this example, and, but the principle, the rationale behind it is has also been the same so. Now have one strategy in the Danube Region, one in the Alpine Region and one in the Adriatic Ionian Region.  Q: As a  A: If you, I mean if you... lets say: there are many now, we have seventeen different areas which are cross-cutting and other policy areas most of them and you can find a lot of detail. The actions which they are planning to implement and the objects in an action plan of the strategy which explains in detail what the different areas and what the strategy intend to do. And of course, I mean the, it’s the first part of the action plan is related a bit to the governing so it works but then there is one part of the objective ´what do we want to achieve´ by working together. And then there's a long part what are the concrete actions we plan to take.   Q: As I  A: There is a web-site also for the strategy and there you can also find a link to the action plan. There is also a link which might be interesting: a list of flag ships. So there is... often there are projects or processes which are then developed in these different policy areas and if they are od macro-regional relevance and important for all member states around the region then they can recive a flagship status and you will also find a list of all these flagships which are currently being implemented and also those who have already been finalized also much for description.  Q: Lots of the work the EUSBSR do rests or are in co-operation with other institutions around the Baltic Sea area such as the Nordic Council and the CBSS and you work some close so-operation with them.   A: Yes, I mean we work indeed very... We are closely co-operating with all the main regional organizations, with the CBSS but also with the Northern Dimension: some on health, on transport, on environment, uhm, with also, but also with HELCOM of cores in the environmental field, with VASAB when it comes to [sustaition] planning, with also with organisations representing the local and regional role authorities, with for example the Union of Baltic Cities which have a role in strategy co-ordinating role with the Baltic NGO-network which also have a role under the strategy in one of the horizontal areas. So, we are working very much with these existing networks so the idea of the strategy is not, has been, not to duplicate the activities which are already taking place but rather to increase in a way the transparency what they are doing because in order to avoid overlaps, so if you have, just to give you an example: if you have this one policy area ´culture´ and there is a lot going on in very different organisations in the Baltic Sea, ARS BALTICA, there is the CBSS doing something on culture under this strategy and there everybody is represented. So they can exchange what they are doing, To see 
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exchange sort of avoid that, ehm, to provide a kind of forum for all of them, to exchange what they are doing and to make sure that they are all working in the same direction and not overlapping in a way. So that’s, uhm. No, they are closely involved with regional organisations. Many of them have responsible role actually as co-ordinating the policy area of bio-economy for example but also innovation in the field of innovation policy area innovation which is a very important one so uhm so they are quite involved as well.  Q: I was thinking: since, eh, well I have main two cases in his study is the Baltic Sea and Nordic Regions and both two regions do with culture and identity as part of their agenda; do you have a thing alike identity or... to draw the region together as one?  A: Yeah, I mean the question of regional identity is something which you, I mean, you will find it in the policy areas topic, lets say this issue also being discussed in the policy area `culture´ so they have some, some also projects which are going into this direction. I think if you have a look at the list of flagships then you will find these specific projects. So, it´s for example some of them go to, relate to, ehm, to the question of history defining the region, sort of looking at the common background and so on, communities, so there is a number of specific, lets say, specific areas in which this question of regional identity is translated into a... in a certain way.  Q: Okey...  A: But probably it I best to look really at what specific projects, what specific flagships are being implemented.  Q: Maybe I should ask...  A: Or maybe even better, maybe even better: get in contact with the coordinators of the policy areas of culture just to call them directly to have a conversation with them.  Q: Yeah I think that would be a bit more suitable.  A: Yeah  Q: They might be a little bit more... closer to the details I want to ask about  A: Yes absolutley. I am sure they would have a lot, a lot to tell you about this field.  Q: Because the different structures of how the organisations works I think that my questions might not be so well adapted to this interview at this time.  [END] 
 Interview Bernd Hemingway (CBSS) 
Interview with Bernd Hemingway (Deputy Director General of the Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat), conducted 2016-06-23 through Skype.  Q is for "question" and always asked by Ulf Friberg.  A is for "Answer" and always given by the person interviewed, this time by Bernd Hemingway.  ----   Q: How would you describe the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) that you represent? [is it a region?]  
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A: That is a very open question. It is a very diverse region. It is a very diverse region with regards to this... to one extent diverse region with regards to its setting 
because we have countries that belongs to the … to the European Union, actually the majority of the countries belongs to the EU. Uhm, then we have two countries in the north, Norway and Iceland who don’t belong to the union but are very close to the union and to a certain extent also implement EU legislation and then we have one country that is not at all connected, or kinda, not to that extent, which is Russia. On the other hand, of course the region has benefit from the joint history, which to some extent given ehm, that there have been, ehm, a lot of war in Europe in the past, is to some extent a negative naturally. But it also had a lot of positive history in terms of culture, of... culture which is that … identical of warrying size, of art, that is [very good] and the development of the region. So, on the one hand it is diverse, on the other hand it is kind of … has interests in common and that is what we try to bring together.  Q: What do you feel would actually be the things that draw this region together? What does join the region to one entity and not many different entities? [What kind of a region is it?]  A: Yes, yes. I think the thing that of course is the connecting thing is the Baltic Sea in the end of the story because it is the connecting thing but, eh, and it is historically the one that connected the different countries with each other because for the longest while the only means of transport for many of the countries for to each other so that is the main connecting thing. But then we look at the policy field of course there are a number of, what can I say, political challenges that you have to adopt and and that you have to address regionally.  I just want to give an example 
of the … of the sustainable development focus that has been [bringing your class here] and with your work but sustainable development that is something that you have to agree on an international level but you also have to do your own work on a regional level. And when we talk about climate change it is an important issue that you can only address jointly. You can agree on global issues but you also have to support climate change, CM2-emmisions, and things like that on the regional level. And then maybe one example from the security field when we talked about civil security about how to respond to disasters. It is very often that either when you have forest fires or when you have oil spillage in the Baltic Sea or any other environment, but disasters in the sea that none of the countries are equipped to handle on their own so there is a need for working together and using the existing equipment to the best possible use.  [lost the sound-feed so started a new recording]  Q: When working together on issues do you work together with the Nordic region or do you work together with the EU to find common strength? [Overlapping of what sort?/ working together to find common strength?]  A: Yeah, I mean, there are different mechanisms that work out. Ehm, first of all we are working together with what we call "the four-sea state council" in the region which is the Artic council, the "Barents Sea / Artic Council", the "Nordic Council" and also the Baltic Sea States, and we are working very closely together. One example is that I went to "Arcam" yesterday for the "Plant-implementing". It is positives in Poland for us that, you know, with the infrastructure that will support different things like tourism, economic development, that kind of positive connection to our region and we will keep that in mind. So, we are actually working where it makes a sense and, uhm, a lot together. We are also working together on, how shall I say, soft policy areas like for example in the area 
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of trafficking of human beings, in particular with the Nordic Council, and other areas and with the EUSBSR. We are actually working very closely together because we are the co-ordinator for the three areas, namely the horizontal action and neighbours of the EU in ... as a member in the CBSS namely Russia, Norway and Iceland. Ehm, we are the coordinators for Safe and Secure which is also one of our long-term priorities as CBSS. And in the area of climate change. And in the other policy and horizontal areas we are very very heavily involved. So that was works together and that makes a lot of sense and we also kind of very active as we are speaking to find and see how we can bring in the "Russian Strategy for the North-Western Region" which is under development and how are we able to connect that with the EU strategy and how we can find synergies between those two strategies that also makes a sense together. So that is how we try to connect all of these areas, to coordinate, to work together where it makes sense, engage where we have added value and otherwise to kinda keep in contact and keep the conversation going and the exchange of information.  Q: In what areas does it make sense to work together?   A: Well! I mean the... I think in some areas it is kinda quite obvious, and in others we are still working together but it is not the case and for example in regional identity we of course we have a very, kind of, specific, how shall I say; when the Northern countries there is a northern identity of the country involved because they have been working together for the longest while and this is something of course we are then the Baltic Sea Region is working on its identity in a way in parallel to see how it engage with those countries that are not part of the Northers. How shall I mean, so there are areas where there makes more sense and some like this one where it does not make that much sense but when we still kind of working together to see and to learn from each other because I think... especially when it is about identity it is a good example of how the Northern country manages to kinda, you know, to bring [pro-sections] of being peaceful, of being...   [Sound broke of again. Restarted the recording]  Q: Do you feel that the Baltic do have a regional identity? [How does this region fit in the theory of regionalisation?]  A: Yes. I really do. There is a regional identity but of course it is to be worked on. It needs to be recognised and it needs to be, needs to, …, it is for sure [where the Baltic [consummation]. I trust to tell you we agree [a lot] on priorities in the CBSS which is prosperous and sustainable region, safe and secure region and the ´regional identity´ is the most challenging of those long-term priorities because it is also something that needs to be developed and that people have to buy into, and, well, given that we have some challenging [laws?] issues at stake for the time being it is, at least on a political level it is, because to do that. And then the other point in this matter, in a way, regional identity is something that you can not, how shall I say, by order of the government say "now we have a regional identity" it is more or less a grass-root event as well – people have to buy into it. And that needs to, kinda, that needs to develop and that needs to be promoted in a way and that needs to have a chance to find out, to grow and that for the all the activity. In a way everything we are doing kind of promoting the regional identity because that is what, kinda, people-contact is about, and because in particularly the contact of young people like youth exchange, youth dialogue and summer university [in the] are particularly important with regards to the development of this huge identity. So, it is in a way [the argument] when you talk about the Baltic region: 
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people know what [this is] about, but it is more the geographical knowledge then about a identity knowledge as we speak for the time being but...  Q: When you develop your strategy for building up, working with culture, identity, you have been inspired by... How have you consciously been developing your strategy for cultural identity? [Did the `other´ affect development?]  A: In the beginning in a way where you look back a little bit, I mean the, we are 25 years next year, and when you look back to the situation in Europe in 1992 the situation in the region was quite different. Ande because it is, or it was, only two of the Baltic Sea states members of the EU, namely Germany and Denmark. So, the main aim at the time was to support European integration on a regional level, and that I trust for the first years for the longest while was the main aim and, of of the CBSS. So, in a way this has now kind of things seems to have settled in a way that we know that we have Iceland and Norway as European economic area countries associated with the EU, Russia and the rest of the member states of the EU- That is basically also the time when the CBSS started to re-orient itself and that was the time when it started to work on this, on this long-term priorities so it is basically  [sounds breaking. Restarting the recording again]  [We could compare method with the EU] and I think there is a kinda, you know, challenge as well to find a European identity, or EU-identity which kinda takes a long time to develop.   Q: But when you start this in 92 was the reason for creating the CBSS it was to draw people together to, as you said, draw it into European context? [European or Baltic core region / identity?]  
A: I think the founding fathers, in a way, in a way there were any fathers … When we were created it was kinda of surrounded experience of the just fall of the Berlin wall and the and the kind of dismantling of the two blocs that had kinda of occupied the Cold War  for the longest period of time in Europe and of course it was important to kind of see how, in regions that were at the border between those two blocks how to kind of bring people closer together and to on common issues and then of course the whole issue of an integrated Europe and to kind of see how it could bring countries together to avoid that kind of cold or real war was kind of [at the heart of] Europe again was what I think the main reason behind creating this so to kind of create a forum were people and countries were able to identify their common issues and to address them.   Q: I think I should go back to when the CBSS... there are issues that we do work together with one another, organisations, with and separately [apart] by yourself, ehm: how much does this influence what you do in your daily organisation? [strategy about overlapping?]  A: I think the work done in, ehm... of the... I think the work for the sister council is in a way of co-ordination so it is not policy setting but it is of course [helping?] [and aided] by analysing and learning from others who were doing a good job and 
sometimes were doing a bad job … sometimes we learn more from a job bad done and that is kinda [dubious] as well. Uhm, then of course what is very inflating in terms of policy is the Russian Strategy for the North-Western Region and the EUSBSR. And because that is, uhm, is of course very influential in terms of policy 
setting and of … [founding/funding] available so, uhm, so lets say the influence is the... the biggest influence is of course is by the Council and by the Committee of senior officials who do the, how shall I say, the day to day management of the organisation. That is where policy is developed and then they draw in the council 
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and we... Then but of course you [develop/ look] left and right and you have your stakeholders and of course you have the EU as a full member in the organisation and then of course the influence  
Q: …  
Q: … I think that we have actually covered some of the main points that I wanted to ask you about.  A: Okey. Sounds good. I feel you have asked everything that I would have talked about anyway.  Q: Well good then.  A: Yeah, that sounds good.  A: what is kind of your aim your, kind what are you making out of this then?  Q: [research talk]  A: [He wants a copy]   [END] 
 Interview Johan Lindblad (Nordic) 
Interview with Johan Lindblad (The Nordic Council Secretariat, Senior Adviser), conducted 2017-12-06 over a call by mobile phone.   Q is for "question" and always asked by Ulf Friberg.  A is for "Answer" and always given by the person interviewed, this time by Johan Lindblad.  ----  Q: Berätta för mig vad norden är och just nordiska samarbetet och hur [hårt] institutionaliserat det är   A: Vill du specificera någon liten aning annars kan jag börja med universums uppkomst  Q: Just syftet med er organisation, vi kan ju hålla oss till den och hur ni står till norden som region.  A: Okey. Ja alltså, man kan väll säga så här: under mellankrigsperioden, alltså 20-talet och 30-talet så var ju till exempel... Finland ansågs ju inte vara "norden" utan tillhöra Baltikum. Så där var man väll lite, på lite sätt ut-definierad som e[tt] nordiskt land, men det ändras ju sen igen. Om vi går till tiden efter andra världskriget så... så försökte man skapa ett nordiskt försvarsförbund, 1949, som kollapsade eller misslyckades på grund av... [...] Det var ju långt gånget, det var bara det att stormakter grep in och ville inte ha något sådant här alternativ block emellan öst och väst utan man ville ha att man skulle ta ställning. Så det föll ju och då insåg man på politisk nivå i norden att det behövde ändå ha en arena för politiskt diskussion, och ja, dialog. Inom då norden och då är ju Finland med i den svängen igen även om man då inte gick med i Nordiska rådet förens 1955 medans dem andra gick med redan 1952 och bildade då det här parlamentariska samarbetet; förstås oförpliktigande men ändå reglerat i Helsingforsavtalet om vad man ska samarbeta om och formerna för det. Och om jag ska säga vad jag bara personligen tycker så... Asså i början så gjorde man ju ganska många, tog man initiativ till ganska många betydelsefulla avtal. Vi har de här klassiska; passfrihet, 
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gemensam arbetsmarknad och rätten att studera i varandras länder och rätten att bosätta sig i varandras länder utan uppehållstillstånd osv va. Så där gjorde man ju ganska mycket i början och det var ju... tunga namn och tongivande politiker i länderna, partiledare och andra toppfigurer som satt med i nordiska rådet. Det var nästan lik-tydligt med internationellt samarbete på den tiden. [...] Och för Finland så var ju Nordiska rådet också en slags av Sovjetunionen tolererad länk till Väst för att hålla lite balans i den här lite känsliga läget som Finland befann sig i i efterkrigstiden. Sen med tiden så har ju Nordiska rådet kanske asså de faktiska maktbefogenheterna har ju inte bestått i någonting annat än rätten att skriva förslag till regeringarna och vetorätt över budgeten (över det nordiska regeringssamarbetets budget). Nu snackar jag om 70-talet och framåt. Så jag tycker att med tiden har det nordiska rådet utvecklats till att bli... Det främsta värdet skulle jag säga är det nätverk som uppstår mellan parlamentariker i de nordiska länderna, asså att man känner varandra kors och tvärs. Parlamentariker går ju in och ut ur regeringar och både tidigare ministrar och parlamentariker upprättar personliga band på tvärs över gränserna. [...min 6:40] Och sen [växer] man, man förstår ju mera varandras system och villkor och man åker ju runt och hamnar på 
olika platser så man får ju en större förståelse för hur […] politik och samhälle fungerar i olika delar av norden och det är ju också en stor fördel naturligtvis.  Q: Det har ju blivit, det finns ju nordiska ministerrådet också, deras samarbete borde ju vara rätt så liknande det här också  A: Ja det känner jag också väl till för där har jag jobbat och det är samma hus som jag befinner mig i nu, vi sitter i samma sekretariat.   A: Ministerrådet bildades 1971. Och det var också en sån här "flopp" som gjorde det.  Nämligen; försöket på slutet av 60-talet att bilda en ekonomisk och tull-union mellan dom nordiska länderna. Och det var ju framförhandlat och i princip klart så att undertecknas det här avtalet, men åter igen så kom stormakter in och [...] Sovjetunionen tyckte att det här kan ju inte Finland vara med i - då blir man ju integrerad i Väst så det ville man ju inte. Då tvingades Finland hoppa av det och då gick liksom andan lite ur resten. Då sneglade Danmark och Norge ner mot Europeiska Gemenskapen (EG): hade folkomröstning om man skulle gå med där och Danmark gjorde ju det och Norge gjorde inte det. Och då ville man liksom, som plåster på såren, göra någonting annat. [min 8:16] Skapa någon annan slags struktur kring regeringssamarbetet och det blev då Ministerrådet 1971. Och det bygger ju på principen om samsyn eller koncensus. Man kan bara göra det som man är överens om: man kan inte göra nånting [när man inte är det].  Q: Mycket av det regionen arbetar med det är kultur också o så och identitet.  A: Ja alltså, Nordiska rådet har ju ett antal priser man ger ut varje år så att för att sätta lite fokus på det kulturella; det är ju litteraturpris och annat, filmpris och så där, och det är väll kanske det Nordiska rådet lite granna mest är känd för - framförallt mest litteraturpriset. Sen har man ju en kultur- Nordiska kulturfonden finns ju också som ska stödja nordiskt kultursamarbete. Delar ut pengar till diverse projekt och administrerar del länder inblandade. Mest är, på de[n] officiella sammarbetesnivån att man satsar på kultur. Sen är det ju klart, vi har ett kulturministerråd och dem satsar ju på diverse olika frågor ock så där.  Q: Samarbetet som sker det är, som du säger, bara i det ni är överens i men är det begränsat på något vis eller är det bara att ni hittar frågor som går att samarbeta i?  A: Det finns ju fasta konstellationer, alltså, det heter ju Nordiska ministerrådet som om det vore ett singularis men det är egentligen elva stycken ministerråd där varje ministerkonstellation har et eget ministerråd: arbetsmarknadsministern har ett, 
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finansministrarna har ett osv. Och så finns det några områden då som av hävd ligger utanför: det är utrikespolitik, det är försvars- och säkerhetspolitik, och, det har också från 2015 ligger även transportpolitik och bostads- bo-byggandefrågor utanför dom prioriterade bortom-grejorna helt enkelt. Men annars så finns det ministerråd för alla områden, inklusive ska jag då tillägga, regionalsamarbete och då menar jag inte Norden utan då menar jag stor-regionerna, de har vi ju massa: vi har tio eller elva olika gränsregionala kommittéer; Nordkalotten och [Mittnorden] och Kvarkenrådet och sådanahärana, Svinesundskommittén, där vi ju inte kan styra med järnhand men där man, då, med lite styrda pengar som de här regionerna då kan söka om, som dom kan få: och dom kommer med vissa villkor och dom ska bidra till det gränsregionala, gränsöverskridande samarbetet på [stor]regional nivå. [11.15].  Q: Det är [...] Koppla de här länderna och de mindre regionerna närmare varandra som mycket av det här riktar sig mot då, Nordiska rådet och Nordiska ministerrådet?   A: Absolut! Det finns ju den här devisen om att "uppnå nordisk nytta"; alltså att om man tjänar på att göra saker tillsammans [eller] att stå var och en för sig som länder, så ska vi sträva efter att göra det tillsammans. Det är ju den ena devisen, den andra är ju kanske lite mer "färskvara" och ändras från tid till annan men statsministrarna har ju proklamerat att Norden ska vara världens mest integrerade region – vad det nu innebär.   Q: Och det har det ju rykte om sig att vara.  A: Ja, precis. Det kan man ju nog nästan säga att det är det förmodligen ändå redan. Gissningsvis. Det vet ingen annan som har ett så ingående samarbete.   Q: Jag har inte hittat [någon] annan region heller som har fokuserat på ett samarbete under en så pass lång tid utan att utveckla nått mer institutionaliserat.  A: Ne. Jag är ingen expert på Benelux-samarbetet men jag har ändå en känsla av att det inte är lika långtgående. Tror inte det. Det skiljer sig så [...] jag kan inte redogöra för det. Ne, men det beror nog också på att [i tillägg] till Nordiska rådet och Nordiska ministerrådet så finns ju hela det här civilsamhälleliga samarbetet som har funnits sedan 1800-talets första årtionden. Föreningen Norden brukar vara en klassiker, men det är inte bara det utan det är ju i princip [...], jag har hört någon säga att det finns tretusen nordiska [sub-]bi-organisationer och det kan ju vara allt från tåg-entusiasternas klubb och frimärkssamlarnas till...  Q: Lite svårt att hålla koll på alla dem tror jag. Hitta alla dessutom.   A: Ja men, men dem bidrar till att hålla ihop kittet mellan länderna och [for]mera känslan av, alltså det finns någonting, det är nånting [...] som känns som om man vill göra saker tillsammans...  Q: Det finns en väl-etablerad gemenskap.  A: Ja. Det kan man lugnt säga. [13.46]   Q: Jag tänkte på det, östersjön och så, mycket av hur... Ja, Finland var ju inte en Nordisk stat enligt andra till att börja med, eller så där som du själv sa. Men, och jag kan ju tänka mig att det som hindrar att andra baltiska stater från att komma in det är ju sovjet och blockpolitiken så att säga fram till nittiotalet.  A: I hög grad ja.   Q: Men sen har ju i alla fall Estland försökt hävda sig lite som nordiskt.  A: Ja.  Q: Och de har väll någon form av roll i Norden, nordiska samarbetet.   
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A: Eh asså, de har ju sökt, alla tre, har ju sökt om att bli en del av nordisk rådet för flera år sedan men inte blivit insläppt. Men dem, det finns ju ett ganska nära samarbete mellan Baltiska församlingen och Nordiska rådet. Vi har ju möten och, presidierna möts och, och så visst, vi är inte integrerade med varandras [...] men det finns en dialog, det är väll [...] de Baltiska staternas samarbete och även staterna var för sig [15.00] är väll [Nordiska och de Nordiska länderna.... närstående grannar]  Q: Vad innebär det här samarbetet, hur händer sig det och vad syftar det till?   A: Man deltar i varandras parlamentariska församlingar. På nordiska rådets möten kommer representanter från Baltiska församlingen [till] observatörer [...] och omvänt kommer det då […] Man har gemensamma internationella strategier, man besöker varandra och deltar i diskussionen i någon grad från gång till gång, punkt till punkt. [Det är inte total-integrerat]  Q: Finns det någonting som jag kan läsa mig på för att se hur, från något möte så där om det finns.  A: Ja jag kan skicka lite grann.  Q: Det hade varit intressant att se det.  A: Nordiska rådet har en internationell strategi som antogs bara för några veckor sedan. Där finns de baltiska länderna med. Den antogs i november, den kan jag skicka till dig.  Q: Det hade varit toppen.  Q: I östersjön finns också Östersjöstaternas råd, och så finns det förstås EUs Östersjöstrategi. Hur förhåller sig noden, hur spelar de här två olika enheterna roll för norden.  A: Jag tror att om du vill ha svar på det så har jag en kollega här som jobbar med just de internationella relationerna för Nordiska rådets sida sett och det är väll bättre att du frågar honom. Jag tror du får bättre svar. [...] Asså östersjösamarbetet, ja det finns ett samarbete men jag har aldrig sysslat med det personligen därför kan jag inte redogöra för det, men däremot har jag en kollega som har de internationella relationerna på sitt ansvarsområde utifrån Nordiska rådets perspektiv. Han kan säkert ge dig mer "up-to-date" på hur och, så där. Jag kan skicka hans kontaktuppgifter till dig.   Q: Det hade varit uppskattat det med.    A: [...]  Q: Jag hade tänkt dra mer mot de internationella relationerna nu i fortsättningen här.  A: Jag är mer Norden Norden och han är mer Norden i det omliggande. [Norden utåt]   Q: Ja ne, de frågor jag hade där är mer i förhållande till Ryssland och östersjöstaternas råd sen också.  A: Men då är det Arne du ska snacka med. Jag är ingen bra person, jag är mer Norden och regionalt samarbete i de här stor-regionalt, inom Norden. Det är min grej, och gränshinder. Det är mitt gebit.   Q: men i så fall tänkte jag bara fråga också då - Just parlamentariker-samarbete och så vidare det är formen på hur Nordiska ministerrådet, nordiska rådet fungerar idag - är det, det finns väll en hel del röster för att nordiska samarbetet ska bli djupare på något vis ändå.  A: Det gör det ju. Det finns en stark... ett stort folkligt stöd för att nordiska samarbetet fördjupas och man talar ju även inom ramen för det internationella samarbetet för Norden. Att det är viktigare att hålla ihop oss mer internt för att [positionera] i gemensam, gemensamt inte minst emot EU, vi måste bli bättre på att 
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implementera EU-direktiv, koordinera [ett, rätt, det] i norden. Så jo, den allmänna känslan och snacket är att Norden har framtiden för sig och hela Brexit-diskussionen gör också någonting - "Okey, Storbritanien var, är, en av våra närmaste partner i EU-samarbetet – Vart ska vi vända blickarna nu?" Och då är det mer Nrden, sen blir det lite mer spretigt beroende på vilket sak det snackas om: digitalisering och sådana här grejor det har ju de nordiska länderna Estland [och de baltiska], sen kommer vi in på värde-politik och då är det inte dem [20.18] då är det kanske Holländare eller några nadra som ligger närmare så då blir det lite spretigare.  Q: Beroende på just frågan i hand så är det olika samarbeten som är, andra samarbetspartner som skiljer sig åt här.  A: Ja precis.   Q: Ren nyfikenhet, när det var tal om Skottlands självständighet så kom det också röster om... vad var anledningen  A: Ja dom ansökte ju faktiskt om medlemskap i Nordiska rådet också och kom inte heller in. De ansökte innan folkomröstningen gjorde de ju. Men det är ofta sådana här saker, och det kan man ju tycka vad man tycker om, men det är ju språk och "ni är ju inte Norden och har inte... ni talar inte ett nordiskt språk" och i det fallet så tror jag också det var lite känsligt för man ville inte sträcka ut en hand mot Skottarna innan folkomröstningen om självständighet skulle kännas som en...   Q: Fel läge för att bete sig sjyst.   A: Ja det är, ja precis. Men skulle det i framtiden bli så att Skottland lämnar Storbritannien och vill vara med i EU igen och då sträcker ut en hand så vet jag inte... förmodligen kan dem inte det för vi har avvisat Baltiska med hänvisning till språk och lite annat så...  Q: Jag undrar lite vad som avgör om ett land är Nordiskt varför Baltikum inte var Nordiskt och så.  A: Bortsett från språk så vet jag inte, jag är inte säker på att det där finns... Det finns ju alltid ett svar som vi ar gett till dem, jag har inte ett det svaret. Jag kan tänka mig bara att språk säkert är ett argument. Det andra kan ju vara att det gjordes på en tidpunkt när dem inte var säkra ekonomiskt helt uppe på samma nivå som det nordiska...  Q: det hade gett en instabilitet i samarbetet kanske?  A: Ja. Och sen tror jag, precis, sen tror jag också att det här också, och det här är ju ingenting jag vet men jag kan tänka mig att det faktum att det bor en relativt stor rysk-språkig minoritet i vissa av de här länderna gör också att man känner att det är lite farligare. Ska man förhålla sig till det hela tiden   Q: En annan form av intern, möjlig intern risk.   A: Ja, men det är bara en spekulation. Det är ju inte långsökt att tänka att det kan vara så [...] Men det finns säkert dokumenterat, Arne kan säkert gräva fram svaren till de här olika.  Q: Jag gräver gärna själv också, jag tänker inte be er att göra mitt jobb åt mig. Det hade varit kul att veta var jag skulle gräva i så fall  A: Vi har det säkert i vårt journalsystem om inte annat.   Q: Okej. Hur kommer man åt det, de får man begära handlingar då.  A: Det får man ju i så fall göra och Arne, det är ju ärenden under presidiet och Arne jobbar jämtemot presidiet så han kan säkert titta på det, gamla handlingar och ta fram det.   Q: Har du någon mejl-adress till Arne så kan jag höra mig av till honom.   
  102 
A: Han är ny men han är bra, han har kanske inte historiken i huvudet men han har kommit igång bra.    [Uppgiftsutbyte]  Då kan han ju skicka de här underlagen jag sa till dig.  [END] 
 Interview Torkil Sørensen (Nordic) 
Interview with Torkil Sørensen (Previously for the Nordic Council Secretariat, Senior Adviser, IR-relations), conducted 2018-02-06 over a call by mobile phone.   Q is for "question" and always asked by Ulf Friberg.  A is for "Answer" and always given by the person interviewed, this time by Torkil Sørensen.  I have been trying to get some questions developed from my RQs and from my readings on ´space´.   ----  [Pleasantries and introduction to the thesis theme/ some in Danish and we switched to English after a short while]  Q: Regionalisation theory, dynamics and other partners in the area of BSR – how has your cooperation been there?  A: [Danish at first but we soon switch language min 6.37] We have this Baltic sea of [commiting contract] cooperation between both national and regional and it is very important for Nordic council. Then we also have more direct contact - between Baltic countries, we have Baltic Assembly [...] organisation to Nordic council. And in my time it was maybe [the] most important partner we had. And I guess it still is but Im just speaking about my time. And then, we had also more direct contact with Duma and the [reigning] council in Moscow and also regional [prime] of north-west Russia but it was not that... it decreased after the Crimera-crisis started 2014. We still had some cooperation but not as close as before after that. But, we increased cooperation in Polen and to some degree also with all the [?-countries]. We also have some but not extensive contact with the [?]. All around the baltic sea we have... common... [8.14] [cooperation] with parliamentary institutions.   Q: I am trying to formulate a question here – with the three baltic countries and relationship with them – what was the purpose?  A: We have both [have] much in common with the baltic assembly. But we also had for instance common debriefings. Sometimes with members of [both] parliaments and members of the opposition parties and sometimes only with opposition parties. When we started to have more cooperation towards Ukraine [indistinct] much cooperation towards former Soviet Union members [poor sound]. And then we had special contact with both Baltic council and the Benelux countries. So we had [...] [interest in EU]   Q: what kind of projects do you have together with the Baltic countries   A: Nordic council is inter-parliamentary cooperation   Q: Yeah OK.   
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A: Nordic council of ministers has offices and projects in Baltic countries and in north-west Russia but for us it was more discussions and so on.  Q: Discussions on what kind of subjects?   A: Internal things like energy and [environment] but it could also be the security situation in the Baltic sea and Europe after Ukraine and those kinds of things.  Q: And the point was to be able to help each other forward with...  A: yeah. [11.25] And in the NC we had some discussion after the Baltic countries joined EU 2004, at that time I worked for the NATO department, [...] some of my colleagues thought ´now was the time to increase cooperation with Baltic states´ [...] We had a special relationship between Nordic countries and Baltic countries after independence and still we are close to each other and [even after they joined the EU we still had much in common about the baltic sea]  Q: This relationship that you had was it special because of something you had in common since before or did it become special   A: [Some words] We were both Baltic Sea countries. [more words]  Q: There was a feeling of brotherhood or?  A: Yes. I think... For a while we thought that Baltic Sea had a to dark view of what had come [out of/ after] the Soviet Union but after quit little we /many countries agreed that it was not just illusion, it was a fact that [...] But still Nordic countries also tried to keep kinda good relations with Russia but [13.35]   Q: I have interviewed some other regional representatives before and the relationship with Russia always, seems to be more, distant and less easy-going to find common ground. Is this something you can relate to? [14.02]  A: Actually, we had strong cooperation with Russia [...] North-Western Russia and they came to Nordic countries. They still do but [stop after Ukraine?] We also had a [...] but they were ladled foreign agents so it was very difficult...  Q: I heard something about Russia trying to size the office in St. Petersburg or documents there  A: They made it very difficult for the Nordic countries to, actually there is still a small office there but it can't function [...] But there is still a direct cooperation   Q: So it is still a space with which you have contact witch and can cooperate with  A: We have contact but it is not that easy, not that good.   Q: What has brought about this change in relationship?  A: First, labelling our offices in [St. Petersburg] and Kaliningrad as foreign agencies [...] made it very difficult to work. But then also the situation after Ukraine. But we still there is cooperation. But we have another area in common with Russia – The Artic cooperation. [...parliamentary platform] [16.35]   Q: And that Arctic cooperation works better than around the Baltic Sea/Nordic relation?  A: Yeah, maybe because of Ukraine is not part of Artic and that means that even after the crisis in Ukraine [that conflict wont resonate as much there] We try to avoid that conflict. Up to now it functions better than Baltic Sea cooperation.  Q: Im thinking that the Artic cooperation works better because it is less connected to society and identity   A: Yeah maybe but [17.27] a big question mark, well not large, but until not it has been less conflict in the north... But I don’t know if it is... we try to keep it a bit low key. [Working on strengthening this cooperation, has employed a young Finnish lady for this (just when I was leaving)] [...]  
  104 
Q: I have gone through most of the more formal questions that I wanted to ask Johan  A: But you could [19.10] come up with something the Nordic [tips on where to find information – Nordic homepage and a document on international...]   Q: Yeah I think I have got that document and bought a book I am reading   A: Actually I never read the final one [about that document on international] [It got the workings]     Q: Im just going to ask some finishing questions [19.49] I have been trying to avoid leading questions but since I have interviewed other people before I have some ideas I want to have tested at least.   Would you say that other organisations that you, like the CBSS and EUSBSR, they are partners that you can contribute with while developing what yourself is trying to work with?  A: Yes, I think the Nordic Council try to work, to have partners to contribute to the cooperation [...] parliamentary [...] more parliamentary cooperation. [...]  Q: I have gotten the answer that these organisations work together when they have something that they can both benefit from and that they can benefit from most subjects that they can find, but when it comes to identity they maybe look more to 
the other to find how they did or didn’t do and tried to develop their own idea of what they [themselves] are supposed to do? [22.03]  
A: We learn from what [others did good] but also from what wasn’t that good. So... Yeah. It will be interesting to see how other EU members did compared to Baltic/Nordic countries so we can also, … But yeah...  Q: But since the Baltic region and the Nordic region, they share partly that same space [ex Sweden, Denmark], does this closeness mix sometimes what they are doing or how, does this strengthen or does this affect [23.15]  A: I think the closeness in the Nordic region is so strong that even when the cooperation is not o strong we are very close [...] Baltic is a little further away. Sometimes it is even suggested a Nordic/Baltic Union. [That was] when I started at the Nordic Council. [...] [we have something close in the Nordic countries, and then we can cooperate with the Baltic countries about other things like the Baltic Sea] [Language is a barrier] In the Nordic Council we try to speak nordic but with the new generation in the Nordic coming up more with English  Q: Yeah I think so too. It is a bit of a change  A: Then we could in-cooperate Baltic states but we could not join [24.40] [up to the future]  Q: Yeah, that is interesting to see how that develops.  A: Just for conclusion I think that first when Nordic countries as Finland Sweden went into the EU and then when the Baltic countries went into the EU they may have the feeling that now we don’t need our small cooperation so much rather the EU but EU is so bit that we also now need this cooperation.  Q: this is a very interesting subject, yes.  A: One [25.25] part of it is really very interesting [...] that is why we have small offices [...] strength in the EU is also important  Q: Has this fact that the EU has come about [...] meant that the Nordic has drawn together... closer?  A:  have the feeling that first [...] important to have cooperation in smaller than the EU  
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Q: How is it, Scandinavia or Nordic still have some sort of joint embassy in Brussels?   A: [26.53] No. but we had a joint embassy early but [joint meeting] joint all the [...] house in common.  Q: I think I am happy with my questions, or happy enough.  [chatter]  Q: Did you have a name for that document?  A: I think it is called "[...] strategy of the Nordic Council"   Q: Yeah, I think I remember it. [27.47] Johan directed me to it as well and gave me a link. ["Nordic Council of Ministers Strategy for Nordic Cultural Co-operation 2013-2020 (revised 2016)"?]  If I have other questions I can come in contact by e-mail?  A: Yes, that is fine.   [End with standard pleasantries]   
 Motive analysis 
Here the motive analysis is combined with the previously described methods as part of an operationalization to give the larger structure an added edge to the conclusions.  Motive analyses are common in the social sciences but unfortunately connected with great uncertainty. Motive analysis aims at mapping the conscious deliberations of an actor before its decision. It is hard to convincingly state that one has succeeded in correctly clarify an actor’s motive on a certain action. Conscious deliberations can have multiple meanings: what do the actor want to achieve, what intentions are there, what is the meaning of this action and how is the collected calculation of the decision? Unaccounted for how the motives are expressed in a study, the goal is the same: When the conscious deliberations have been observed one has also explained why an actor acted as it did201.   Some important aspects of the analysis are: the motive analysis is a common approach in the social sciences and the actor or actors can be one or many, state or party. When the actor is a collective (an actor of more than one) it has to be represented in the analysis of a smaller or larger number of physical persons, usually members with decision making capability. Since an organization as such do not have conscious deliberations a motive analysis is logically impossible. The first step of a motive analysis is thus to find the persons who represent the actor (in this thesis they are the knowledgeable persons working for and representing their regional spokesperson institutions). After the subjects have been identified the second step is to consider which the possible motives for action might have been. Here the possible motives are considered without pre-definition, meaning that all 
                                                                                                                                                            201 Esaiasson, P, Gilljam, M, Oscarsson H, and Wängnerud L, 2007:327p 
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possible motives are open for observation. Studies working without pre-definitions have the advantage to be open to what is actually observed in the material studied.   The collection of motive-indicators begins with an overview of the decisions that are to be explained. The theory developing method and the motive analysis method melds into the same process since a standard advice for the application of both are the same; think of implications that follow a possible motive: If the actor is driven by a certain motive like this and that the circumstance, the context should implicate and strengthen the validity of this certain motive. With such a list of implications, the researcher gathers a tool for searching for motive indicators. One type of indicators that always should be strived to discover are the actors' direct motivations. Strategizing towards ´overlapping space` assumes that regions makes conscious deliberations and it is therefore important to find out how they want to explain their actions. To collect direct motivations, one has to be open to ideas concerning sources of material. This is why more than one type of sources are used and not specified to one type of documents. Esaiasson, et.al writes that since the purpose with interviews are to reach the real motives behind conscious deliberations and the actors certain ways of doing things – the information given can thus be more or less correct202. The third step in the motive analysis is to value the motive-indicators: to weigh and decide how viable the indicators are to draw conclusions about the 
actors’ conscious deliberations. Even if the materials analysed are not definite indicators, actions and patterns of overall strategization is set in context and possibly indicate certain processes. For an argument about motive to be viable an action has to correspond with the motive in question. Through an analysis between action and motivation there is certainly possible to dismiss some possible motives. However, it is not impossible that one action can be explained by more than one motive203.    
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